IRAQ
CRADLE OF ERRORS
C. Brandt Smith, Jr.
Smashwords Edition
Copyright 2011 by C. Brandt Smith, Jr.
http://www.brandtsmithconsulting.com
brandt@brandtsmithconsulting.com
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage system without expressed written permission in writing from the author.
Cover Design by TruthMediaDesign, S. Greg Smith and Jarred Butler
Photographs by C. Brandt Smith, Jr.
Figures and Tables by C. Brandt Smith, Jr.
Dedication
To the loves of my life -
Gailia and Amber who lived two years
In Iraq with me and gave me strength
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1. HOW DID I GET HERE?
CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL CHANGES: AN EMIC AND ETIC VIEW
Background Information about Iraq
Background on Saddam Hussein’s Leadership
Iraqi Ethnicity, Religion, and Cultures
Overview of Authentic Leadership Theory
Overview of Transactional Leadership Theory
Overview of Transformational Leadership Theory
Overview of Servant Leadership Theory
Overview of Laissez-Faire Leadership Theory
Synthesizing the Key Principles
Maximizing Leadership Development through Synthesis
Understanding Social Psychological Processes
The Efficacy of Cultural Diversity, Achieving a Competitive Advantage in an Emerging Democracy
Review of Research Methods Considered
A Comparison of the Research Methods
CHAPTER 3. PATHWAY TO UNDERSTANDING
CHAPTER 4. PERCEPTIONS REVELED
Exploratory Questions Responses
Recommendations for Future Research
PREFACE
As country leader for Millennium Relief and Development Services (MRDS), a non-government organization (NGO), in Baghdad from June 2006 until April 2008, I was an eyewitness to the effects of disparate leadership models in Iraq. Initially, the streets were piled with rubble and burning cars dotted the landscape. Checkpoints were set up at numerous intersections and an eerie nervousness permeated the entire area. I discovered Baghdad to be in a lawless state with little security for the residents. It seemed no one was secure or exempt from the chaos and instability of the sectarian rift. Throughout the initial two years I served as director of MRDS, incidents of chaos and lawlessness were often observed and living conditions were deplorable. These events led me to a strong desire for deeper inquiry. I hypothesized there was a link between current leadership models and continued levels of instability in Iraq. Further observation led me to believe political parties and insurgent groups were benefiting from the lack of sound leadership organization and structure.
I have been a student of leadership principles for many years and had observed some of the best and brightest leaders actively leading their organizations and businesses throughout my long career of living in Taiwan, Thailand and China. I have also been privileged to witness the tribal and parliamentary political leadership of Iraq wrestle with various issues related to their own democratization and stabilization.
In the pages that follow, I do my best to write what I saw and experienced. These “lived experiences” where further challenged by the fact, I was running an organization during the U.S. military SURGE with my wife and our twelve year of daughter during one of the most incredibly chaotic times in Iraq’s recent history. Our family literally faced all the challenges and violence associated with that time period and lived on the economy with minimal security. I appreciate the opportunity to share my research, insights, thoughts and outcomes with you.
Perhaps the most distressing result of my research relates to the failure of the Government of Iraq to take advantage of the opportunity, the gift of democracy. The average local national believes they are marginalized and have traded one tyrant for a parliament filled with tyrants. Read on…
CHAPTER 1
How Did I Get Here?
Arriving in Baghdad was truly an eye opening experience. My wife and twelve year old daughter stepped off the plane and immediately felt the intense heat of the region hit our faces. We each had two suitcases and our one hand carry to get through customs and immigration. There was no air conditioning inside the airport and I began to wonder, “What have I done?”
We were met by two friendly Iraqis who worked for Millennium Relief and Development Services. They would become our closest and most trust friends during the next two years. I didn’t know then how valuable they would be to our family. We would be totally dependent upon them for our security, groceries and important relationships.
The drive from the Baghdad International Airport was another moment that caused me to wonder if I had made a wise decision. Roadblocks, burned out cars, demolished buildings and chaos surrounded us. I didn’t think it could get worse, but I was wrong. The first week plunged me into leading community action group (CAG) leadership training workshops under a contract signed with International Relief and Development (IRD) in Baghdad with most of the participants in various stages of grief, anger and frustration.
Most of the Iraqi people attending these workshops were warm and friendly, embracing the methodology being taught. They were desperate for any training opportunity that would possibly put Iraq on the road to recovery. During these first few days I discerned that perhaps a grassroots leadership development program could help the Iraqi people with their country’s leadership needs, and perhaps personal involvement could facilitate in some small way positive changes. I would try to introduce leadership strategies that would enrich understanding, rather than hinder potential advancement and growth as the Iraqi government shifted from a dictatorship to a people centered democratic model of leadership.
The workshop was conducted at a local restaurant on Kindi Street in the neighborhood called al-Harthia. More than once we would be interrupted by sporadic gunfire and an explosion or two. The electricity would constantly go off. With the use of an uninterrupted power supply I was able to keep the laptop and power point projector on and the workshop would continue.
Occasionally someone would come into our meeting and whisper to an attendee, who would then get up and leave the room. When they returned, I would be interrupted with an announcement, “Muqtoda al-Sadr’s militia was coming down the street.” Everyone was frightened. Our workshop would end and everyone would leave promising to return the next day if possible. This happened frequently during those first few days.
During the first 15 months in Iraq, I observed phenomena through close personal contact, described by Creswell (2003) as “the essence of human experiences or lived experiences” (p. 15). The feelings of hope were fading and the Iraqis who once saw an opportunity to develop their nation were now leaving by plane and bus loads to any country that would receive them. An outcome of this exodus presented me with numerous opportunities to ask local Iraqi men and women what their thoughts were regarding the effects of the leadership models now in place in Iraq. Their answers were incredible as was their desire to genuinely share their feelings and opinions without fear of reprisal to themselves and their families.
If given an opportunity to speak, would the people of Iraq discuss their personal thoughts about the leadership needs of their country? I believed Iraqi nationals were willing to engage in conversation and were open to discuss their thoughts if provided the opportunity to do so.
My heart has never been as grieved as it was over the people who lived in the city of Baghdad and the surrounding communities and villages all around Iraq. Over the past 19 years, I and my family has lived in several cities around the world. There have been cities with populations of greater than 12 million and cities with populations as few as in the thousands. We have invested our lives learning culture, language, and the local customs. We have always been challenged beyond what most people are willing to endure, but this country was the most challenging.
Living in Baghdad, Iraq’s largest city and the nation’s capitol, was very challenging and even more difficult than anything we have ever experienced. During those first 15 months, I lost dozens of friends due to the violence and chaos that had become commonplace in this dangerous city. I kept track of the deaths of my friends in a small notebook. When my list reached 76 names, I could no longer bring myself to record the names of Iraqis I personally knew who had been killed by assassination, random shootings, and car bombs. It just hurt too deeply to keep recording those names.
When I completed the two years as country director for Millennium Relief and Development Services, our family was emotionally spent. During our last week in Baghdad we survived a five hour gun battle and over one hundred mortars and rockets which landed near our home. It was a difficult final week. As a matter of fact, we had no cell phone connectivity and were cut off from using the internet as well. We literally hunkered down and waited for cell phone and internet services to be restored. Once we were back online and could get messages out, we were instructed to exit Iraq for Jordan.
Leaving proved to be another major hurdle. Our Iraqi co-workers and office managers had to secure a flight out for us. This took an additional three days. Finally, with tickets in hand and our six pieces of luggage packed, we were ready to make our way to the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP).
As news spread through our small community of our departure, neighbors and Iraqi friends came to our home. Our house had been a refuge for hurting people for nearly two years, and now we were leaving. The last night many people stood at our gate and doorway to say their good-bye. They finally went home around midnight. The next morning, more friends were standing at the gate to wave goodbye as we were driven to BIAP. Tears flowed freely as we said our own goodbye.
I knew before I left Iraq I needed to return. I had research to conduct and interviews to complete. As a doctoral researcher, I wanted to begin investigating the effects of current leadership models in Iraqi society and I was compelled to complete my field research. How would I do this? I needed some avenue to get me back into Iraq - without my wife and daughter. They had endured so much and needed some normalcy. I could not provide them what they needed in country. So, with heavy hearts we left and I began searching for opportunities to facilitate my solo return.
If an opportunity developed, I might be strategically placed to conduct field interviews. Then, with knowledge discovered, offer recommendations for consideration by those in the Iraqi and coalition government. Shortly after our return to the United States, I received an email request suggesting I take a position with BAE Systems, Inc. as a social scientist attached to a United States Army Brigade in Iraq. With access to the population, I would be in a position to conduct sociocultural and ethnographic research up close and personal.
This would mean returning to Iraq in a different job, but ideally positioned to seek the answers to my questions in the spirit of unfettered inquiry, as witness to and subject to the same daily problems and security risks as my Iraqi friends and U.S. Military service men and women. After six months training and preparation in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, I returned to Iraq setting the stage for accomplishing my desired research.
I signed a contract with BAE Systems, Inc. in September 2008 just shy of sixty days of our return to the USA. Soon I was in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas being trained for my new role, social scientist. After months of training and being stretched once again beyond my skill and previous experience, I was boots on the ground in Iraq by April 2009.
Social anthropologist Boissevain (1974) notes “in a situation of conflict, persons will attempt to define the situation and align themselves in such a way that the least possible damage is done to their basic values and to their important personal relations” (p. 50). Relationships for Iraqis, like most Arabs, are valued in proportion to their proximity. Iraqis identify first with their immediate family, then with their extended family or clan, then with their village, and then with their tribe, followed by their country and their religious sect. Other anthropologists and social scientists may argue this finding, but after nearly six years in Iraq, I reached the conclusion that family is first.
However, when a nation identifies with their religious beliefs, as do Iraqis, these relationships are often blurred or skewed. Shi’a, Sunni and secular coalitions or political parties are formed around personalities and the Islamic faith. I also discovered Iraq to be a very complicated mix of tribal affiliations and political blocs.
This relational flow or hierarchical construct of relationships spills over into the selection of leaders. When poor leadership is in power, the people furthest from the concentric circle of the relationship core suffer, leading to the leadership dilemma in Iraq. I would describe the Arab worldview as complex. An example would be trying to explain how proximity to authority (LMX: Leader Member Exchange) reflects allegiance (compliance or resistance) and appears to be the basis for positive or negative outcomes.
However, when local nationals are distanced from their national government, as most Iraqis are, there is less compliance. The disconnection also precipitates misunderstanding and mistrust of those in power toward the people furthest from the seat of the national government.
The conducted research on the problem of leadership in Iraq focuses on the people who stayed and endured the hardship of Saddam Hussein, the Iraq-Iran war, and two invasions by coalition forces. I observed a recurring theme of trust emerge during dialogues with Iraqi nationals, trust in political party leadership with power and influence to rally the Iraqi people during this present time in their history. Many Iraqis I encountered remain positive about the future of their country, but were skeptical of following recently returning Iraqis who chose to live abroad during the difficult days of Saddam’s leadership and the wars.
The hypothetical link of current and past leadership models in Iraq to current levels of instability postulated by my research is a result of a personal cognitive reflexivity process. However, the behavioral link of current and past leadership models to present behaviors appears to be causal in nature, but needs more study to reach a verifiable conclusion. Liebermann (2003) claims that at every turn and at each moment in our daily lives, we are making countless implicit judgments and decisions that allow us seamlessly to make sense of and navigate through our social world. I concluded the trauma experienced by surviving Iraqis who lived through multiple wars and sectarian violence validates the statement made by Liebermann.
In addition to the personal interest I had conducting my own research; I conducted hundreds of interviews across southern Iraq during two deployments with the Human Terrain System. I saw the truth of Liebermann’s statement over and over. Iraqis were making countless implicit judgments and decisions on a daily basis which allowed them to make sense of and navigate their world. It was a coping mechanism that helped make sense of their violent world.
Further addressing this issue, Ambady and Rosenthal (1993) stated that we intuitively make sense of the nonverbal messages in the environment and often reciprocate appropriately without any effort. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) develop this thought, claiming we automatically judge objects as more likeable based on previous exposure or their position in a display. Researchers claim that we spontaneously make sense of behavior in terms of intentions and traits (Gilbert, 1989; Winter & Uleman, 1984).
During my two tours as a social scientist, I worked in eight different provinces in southern Iraq. I became well acquainted with village and community life in these areas. I was curious and being paid to be curious. Particular interest to me was the internal shift of people groups. These people groups were tribal, clans and basic family units.
Documents I reviewed, based on information gathered from families interviewed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) dating from January 2006 through April 2008 state 6,291 families came into Dhi Qar Province and only 101 left. In Maysan Province 6,164 families (36,984 individuals) entered the province and only 2 families (about 12 individuals) left. In both provinces the majority of the in-flow of internally displaced persons was Shi’a from Baghdad. People were fleeing one danger zone for another.
Fawcett and Tanner (2002) state “It is thought that those displaced Marsh Arabs who did not flee to Iran relocated in an-Nasiriyah and al-Amarrah, or fled to Baghdad and Basra, home to large numbers of Marsh Arabs who had migrated prior due to economic issues for decades, or were possibly sent north to inhabit former Kurdish and Turkmen properties under Saddam’s Arabization campaign” (p. 12). By the time I had completed two tours with the U.S. Army, Human Terrain System in Iraq, and two years previously as country director of MRDS representing a total of nearly five and a half years, exposure to numerous tribal clans, including various Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq, I had formed a definite opinion of what was happening in country. My experiences in dealing with war ravaged people indicated the majority of local nationals were exhibiting a mentality of hopelessness. However, as of the summer of 2009, many Iraqis began sensing better days were ahead; they began returning to their ancestral properties and looking for opportunities to live in peace, rear their children, and choose leaders with solid motives to lead the nation. This would change once again for the worse as the government of Iraq struggled to form after the last national election held in March 2010.
The return of the Marsh Arabs to southern Iraq is significant because they were once the focus of Saddam’s cruel hatred. These tribal people of Southern Iraq were traditionally fisherman and farmers, living day-to-day from what they produced from the land or fished from the marshes. By 1999, Saddam’s drainage of the marshes was largely complete. The only remaining marsh of any size was the al-Hawizah marsh that straddles the Iraq-Iran border. This marsh was left partly intact because the Iranians controlled the flow of some of its sources of water. As late as 2002, Saddam’s regime was still attacking Marsh Arab villages, burning the reeds, and preparing for military assaults on Iraqi Army deserters hiding in the marshes.
According to the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq’s Lower South, by 2002 many displaced male Marsh Arabs had begun returning to the Maysan and Basra Provinces. It is estimated that just prior to the 2003 invasion 40,000 to 50,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran were Marsh Arabs. Of the 400,000 Marsh Arabs present in the late 1970s, almost all were forced off their traditional territory and only 1,600 or so remained, living on traditional floating grass platforms at the time of the 2003 Coalition Force invasion.
In April 2009 while conducting assessments for the U.S. Army near the town of Qalat Salih, I spoke with several respected community leaders about the future of Iraq. There was optimism and excitement about returning family members who had fled during the war, future choices for governing leadership, and the personal rights they expected to have in the new Iraq. They expressed their desire to understand how to promote a political candidate and what qualities a leader needed. They also spoke about the issue of respect for traditional tribal sheikh leadership and the conflicts this could represent in moving forward with the new Iraq.
These discussions were of particular significance to me as a social scientist and as a doctoral candidate studying the issue of leadership in Iraq. The local nationals with whom I spoke were passionate, knew what they wanted and were focused on achieving it. What I feared was fast talking, promise makers would deceive these simple and trusting people. That is exactly what would happen as many would eventually realize.
The issue of leadership in Iraq poses a dilemma. The needs of the Iraqi people should be considered and heard by decision makers, who have the positional authority to improve their daily lives. The opinion of common Iraqi females and males should be taken seriously as their democracy continues to take form. What Iraqis think about their choices and options for leadership and their perceptions regarding leadership qualities are important issues of which the international community should be made aware.
As I worked on my doctoral research, I determined that a qualitative methodology where personal interviews would be conducted was the approach I should use to engage the local national populace in order to ask for their thoughts and feelings about the effects of current leadership models. Discerning which leadership models work in Iraq lends itself well toward this methodology. The opportunity to collect relevant research data based on interviews and questionnaires provided ample opportunity to complete a qualitative study during my personal time while completing my last tour of duty.
Separate from my research proposal, I conducted meetings with Iraqis as part of the ongoing work of the Coalition Forces. The research represented in this book does not include that prior work and was conducted apart and separate from my work for the U.S. Army even though the benefits and information outcomes where broadly shared with many interested commanders and their staff.
The purpose of this study was to discern what leadership models were most acceptable to the Iraqi people. Determining leadership models best suited and acceptable in Iraq will assist local Iraqi nationals with capacity building for self-governing and what to look for in political candidates running for elected office. The research in Iraq allowed a unique observational perspective for getting close to the people.
The issue surrounding future political leadership in Iraq was a primary topic for discussion by many local residents with whom I interacted. Local Iraqi residents expressed concern for leadership choices as the 2010 election continued to present a choice dilemma, which permeated their society and challenged the status quo of the traditional ancient tribal sheikh structure. The sheikh has been and continues to be the central influential figure in Iraq’s more rural areas, but his influence diminishes somewhat as people look toward civil government to settle their legal problems. This has created a struggle between traditional tribal law and the civil courts.
The need to find capable and trained individuals for local city government positions and provincial council seats are also needs to be met. On the national level or parliamentary level, power struggles continue as the emerging government of Iraq seeks to locate qualified men and women to serve the people.
The former dictator, Saddam Hussein, ran the country from his position of authority in Baghdad. Provincial and city government positions were generally appointed and based on wasta (an Arabic term relating to the concepts of relationship and influence) with the former dictator’s government. Now, Iraqis are expressing themselves and are eager to choose their own representation. The officials elected by popular vote will be expected to serve the greater good of the constituency. Iraqis have a voice as demonstrated by casting their vote for elected officials. One challenge facing the populace is determining what leadership models best represent the common good of the public.
As I previously stated, independent and separate from job related tasks as a social scientist working for the U.S. Army, I had the opportunity to engage Iraqi nationals in conversational interviews regarding the issue of leadership, which may add to generalizability of useful information regarding phenomenological shifts in power structures and personal human rights choices now emerging in this region of the Middle East. The benefit of this research is that it will enable better decision making and promote the broader understanding of the shifting paradigms in Iraqi culture.
I discovered through the hundreds of interviews conducted that the Iraqi people are warm and friendly, eager to be involved in the affairs of their nation. They are willing to discuss their concerns and voice opinions. Observations and interactions that occurred during numerous key leader engagements and discussions were simple. However, the people of Iraq are beginning to show signs of war weariness coupled with a strong desire for Rule of Law maturity. There will be hiccups along the road to stability and peace, but many people are ready for a new day as they write their history.
Perceived leadership problems and rational thinking skills reflect the changing attitudes among Iraqis who want to make things better. As these thoughts come to the attention of Iraqi voters and decision makers, I believe these attitudinal changes and feelings should be documented for future ethnographic and cultural studies.
Addressing the leadership dilemma by attempting to identify leadership models or traits Iraqis find appealing or unappealing may help identify a template for choosing future leaders within the nation. My personal goal was to complete the research which may provide insight into Iraqi rationale regarding why some leaders gain a great following and other leaders do not.
The rationale for my research foci was the issue of understanding national Iraqi choices in supporting certain candidates running for district council, local, and national positions. I was interested in identifying links between leadership and followership. The identification of culturally acceptable, positive and negative leadership models currently in place in Iraq would prove or disprove my stated hypothesis: “There is an acceptable leadership style to the Iraqi people.” Discovering leadership preferences will establish baseline awareness and identify opportunities certain political figures will find that are acceptable to local nationals as they cast their votes in future elections.
Since 1979 many Iraqis have only known one national leadership role model, the president and dictator Saddam Hussein. I think an opportunity now exists to identify alternative leadership models, which exist among the people of Iraq that are compatible with their worldview and culture.
The significance of the research I conducted underscored leadership perceptions identified through unfettered inquiry and the effects of those current leadership models as they related to choices made by Iraqis. These decisions may have influence on continued levels of stability in a post-Saddam Iraq. The more I interacted with Iraqis during my time in country, the more I realized the international community’s current level of understanding of the Iraqi people is incomplete. I was constantly amazed at the preconceived ideas most foreigners had about how to engage, train and talk with common people.
As a director for a non-government organization, I was literally out in the population daily. It was my job. As a matter of fact, there were many instances where I would be tipped off to potential trouble by a local national. For example, my staff would receive phone calls on the morning of a planned meeting letting me know I should not attend a workshop or gathering. I was protected by the locals on many occasions. The perception held by many with whom I most recently worked was, all Iraqis cannot be trusted and since we know more than they know, we run the show. I think this perception is wrong. When sincere relationships are formed and there is equal value placed on the friendship, the traditional hospitality, which includes protection, is extended.
More research is necessary to provide accurate data to nation building organizations desiring to assist Iraq reach an acceptable level of stability. The concept of nation building is built on mutual trust and earned over time. One of the mistakes we made in Iraq was in undervaluing relationships. More than once I watched relationships diminish due to the nature of deployment turnovers. We simply did not have Soldiers or U.S. State Department people stay long enough to move relationships from surface acquaintances to genuine friendships. As I stated, loyalty is directly linked to proximity. This thought was ever present in my mind as I met with various local nationals, whether they were local elders, tribal sheikhs or representatives of the Iraqi government. We simply were not going to get the support we wanted by meeting for a few minutes and then leaving.
The average deployment of our armed forces was one year. Many of the U.S. State Department personnel served six months or less. I noticed numerous rotations during my nearly six years and as the faces changed, so did the relationships. Continuity was lost over and over again. Nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and international businesses desiring to work in Iraq will benefit from the outcome of my study, but longevity is the key. The research provided foundational information for other researchers who want to expand the knowledge of leadership in Iraq.
Leadership is influenced by contextual factors such as culture (Zhu, 2007). To expand the current body of leadership knowledge in the broader international context Tsui (2007) urges that experienced mainstream scholars collaborate with new international researchers in the pursuit of vital research agendas through serious engagement in deep contextualization, novel questioning, and innovative theorizing. A rather simple example was in the identification of individuals early in the war. As we began to record the names of detainees, thousands of men were thought to be related. Their names were recorded as “Abu.” One Soldier remarked, “I thought, why do they all have the same name?” Later it was discovered that “Abu” was a word used to describe the “father of…” For example, if a man is called, “Abu Ahmed” it simple means his first born son’s name is Ahmed. Therefore, the father is called, “the father of Ahmed.” This was one of the simple mistakes made repeatedly in a culture so foreign to our own.
There are several terms I will use throughout this book. Readers familiar with military terms will not need these definitions, but average civilians will find this section helpful to their understanding. Prior to my own involvement with the military, my vocabulary was weak. I would sit in on meetings or briefings and jot down terms and acronyms completely unfamiliar to me. The learning curve was steep and I am still being stretched. The following terms will be helpful:
Area of Operation (AO). A military term used to define a specific area of operation.
Authentic Leader. The authentic leader is described as having the ability to provide an unbiased comprehension of multiple points of view (or sides) of an issue while behaving in accordance with one’s true self (Avolio & Gardner, 2005).
Brigade Commander (BC). A military term used to define the leadership role of a lieutenant colonel or colonel with command over 4,000 to 5,000 troops.
Contingency Operating Base (COB). Another term for a forward operating base. A military installation from where operations into a specific area house personnel.
Culturally Endorsed Implicit Leadership Theories (CEILT). The term refers to the shared cultural agreement with respect to leader attributes and behaviors that is viewed as contributors or impediments to effective leadership within a culture.
Insurgent. A person or group of persons with a grievance opposed to their own civil government.
Iraqi Police (IP). The locally recognized enforcers of Iraqi law.
International Relief and Development (IRD). IRD is a charitable, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization focusing its operations in regions of the world that present social, political, and technical challenges. IRD specializes in facilitating and supporting assistance that is tailored specifically to those most in need. IRD’s mission is to reduce the suffering of the world’s most vulnerable groups and provide tools and resources needed to increase their self-sufficiency.
Laissez-faire. To allow events to take their own course, or to allow people to do what they choose. Literally, “let it be” or “leave it alone.”
Leadership. A process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal (Northouse, 2004).
Millennium Relief and Development Services (MRDS). MRDS is an international network of development centers committed to helping people trapped in hopeless situations around the world. It is dedicated to delivering intelligent compassion to people in complex situations.
Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). The combined military of various nations involved in occupying the nation of Iraq.
Nongovernmental Organization (NGO). An NGO is an organization with primary goals related to humanitarian aid and relief. These organizations may specialize in medical, educational, agricultural, and other specific areas of need.
Personal Security Detail (PSD). Special hired security forces from outside Iraq, and in some cases within Iraq, who provide security to political leaders and business leaders.
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). A PRT is a unit introduced by the U.S. government, consisting of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction subject matter experts, working to support reconstruction efforts in unstable states. PRTs were first established in Afghanistan in late 2001 or early 2002, and as of 2008 operate there as well as in Iraq. While the concepts are similar, PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq have separate compositions and missions. The purpose of the PRT is to empower local governments to govern their constituents more effectively.
Servant Leadership. A philosophy in which the leader acts in a service oriented role, providing support for stakeholders (Greenleaf, 1977).
The Global and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE). GLOBE is a multiphase, multi-method project in which investigators spanning the world are examining the interrelationships between societal culture, organizational culture, and organizational leadership.
Transactional Leadership. Transactional leadership is a social exchange where the leader and the follower interact for some type of trade to take place.
Transformational Leadership. A style of leadership in which the leader identifies the needed change, creates a vision to guide the change through inspiration, and executes the change with the commitment of the members of the group (BusinessDictionary.com, 2007).
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is the U.S. federal government organization responsible for most nonmilitary foreign aid. USAID is an independent federal agency receiving overall foreign policy guidance from the U.S. Secretary of State and seeks to extend a helping hand to those people overseas struggling to make a better life, recovering from a disaster, or striving to live in a free and democratic country.
The assumption I made was simple, there is a perceived leadership dilemma in Iraq. My assumption was based upon observations I made while residing in Iraq between June 2006 and June 2011. The limitations placed upon my interviewing local nationals included time and access in order to engage specific population segments in conversation, language barriers, and the length of time I would have in Iraq. Trust is built over time and I was painfully aware that five or six years in a culture so different than any I had previously lived would be challenging.
Other limitations I faced related to the questionnaire I developed and wanted to use in order to gather feedback from participants. The trust factor associated between me and those local Iraqi nationals who volunteered to be involved in my study was also a concern. A delimiting factor associated with the security risks involved in doing field research included conducting field research in the safety of U.S. forward operating bases where many Iraqi nationals were employed, which addressed access to population issues and the security issue directly. Additional limitations included the relationships I built between myself and the participants involved in this study. Some of the relationships went deep rather quickly, others did not. I struggled with time and access.
The Iraqi nationals who lived off U.S. military bases presented me with a rare opportunity to collect culturally relevant ethnographic data in a war zone. Living under intense pressure to respect anonymity and threats was also a challenge. Not only did I need to provide a degree of safety for the men and women I would interview, I was mindful of my own safety. Conducting research in a dangerous environment was risky.
The local Iraqi nationals employed by the U.S. Army came to work daily entering the COB and returned home every evening, which was a direct indication the security situation had dramatically improved in Southern Iraq. With informed consent, these Iraqi employees were cooperative, responsive, and willing to share information that was used to determine atmospherics. The term atmospherics simply describes what is happening in a specific area of operation. It literally means, who lives here? What is the economy like? And, how many people live in this area? It also allowed me to discover tribal and political connections as well as the predominant religious beliefs of the community. I employed standard processes to conduct the ethnographic research.