Space Shuttle NASA Mission Reports: 1997 Missions, STS-81, STS-82, STS-83, STS-84, STS-94, STS-85, STS-86, STS-87
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), World Spaceflight News
Smashwords Edition
Copyright 2012 Progressive Management
Questions? Suggestions? Comments? Concerns? Please contact the publisher directly at
Remember, the book retailer can't answer your questions, but we can!
* * * * * * * * * * *
Smashwords Edition, License Notes
This ebook is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This ebook may not be re-sold or given away to other people. If you would like to share this book with another person, please purchase an additional copy for each person you share it with. If you're reading this book and did not purchase it, or it was not purchased for your use only, then you should return to Smashwords.com and purchase your own copy. Thank you for respecting the hard work of this author.
* * * * * * * * * * *
This is a privately authored news service and educational publication of Progressive Management. Our publications synthesize official government information with original material - they are not produced by the federal government. They are designed to provide a convenient user-friendly reference work to uniformly present authoritative knowledge that can be rapidly read, reviewed, or searched. Vast archives of important data that might otherwise remain inaccessible are available for instant review no matter where you are. This e-book format makes a great reference work and educational tool. There is no other reference book that is as convenient, comprehensive, thoroughly researched, and portable - everything you need to know, from renowned experts you trust. For over a quarter of a century, our news, educational, technical, scientific, and medical publications have made unique and valuable references accessible to all people. Our e-books put knowledge at your fingertips, and an expert in your pocket!
* * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * *
SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION REPORT
March 1997
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
INTRODUCTION
STS-81 was the fifth of nine planned missions to dock with the Russian Mir Space Station and the fourth crewmember transfer mission. Astronaut John Blaha, who was on the Mir since September 19, 1996, was replaced by Astronaut Jerry Linenger. The double Spacehab module was carried for the second time, and it housed experiments that were performed by the crew and logistics equipment (in excess of 6,000 lb) that was transferred to the Mir. After transfer of equipment to the Mir, space was provided for return items from the Mir.
The STS-81 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the activities such as rendezvous and docking and experiment operations. This report also discusses the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) performance during this eighty-first mission of the Space Shuttle Program. STS-81 was the fifty-sixth flight since the return to flight and the eighteenth flight of the Atlantis (OV-104). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated ET-83; three Phase II SSMEs that were designated as serial numbers 2041, 2034, and 2042 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBs that were designated BI-082. The two RSRMs were designated RSRM-54 with one installed in each SRB. The individual RSRMs were designated as 360T054A for the left SRB, and 360T054B for the right SRB.
The STS-81 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VII, Appendix E. The requirement is that each organizational element supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware and software evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objectives of this flight were to perform the fifth rendezvous and docking with the Russian Mir Space Station and perform a logistics resupply and the exchange of a Mir Astronaut. A double Spacehab module carried science experiments and hardware (including the Biorack facility consisting of two incubators, a glovebox, and two refrigerators as well as a refrigerator/freezer), the Space Acceleration Measurements System (SAMS), Risk Mitigation Experiments (RMEs) and Russian logistics in support of the Phase 1 Program requirements.
The secondary objectives of this flight included the performance of the KidSat Payload activities, and the Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM) activities; and, as a payload of opportunity when the objectives could be met without impacting the flight, the performance of the Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX).
The STS-81 flight was planned as a 10-day plus 2-contingency-day flight. The two contingency days were available for bad weather avoidance for landing or other Orbiter contingency operations. The sequence of events for the STS-81 mission are shown in Table I, and the Orbiter In-Flight Anomaly List is shown in Table II. The Government Furnished equipment/flight crew equipment (GFE/FCE) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table III.
Appendix A lists the sources of data, both formal and informal, that were used in the preparation of this report. Appendix B provides the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used throughout the report. All times during the flight are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time (MET).
The seven-person crew for STS-81 consisted of eight persons because of the crewmember exchange that occurred. The crewmembers were Michael A. Baker, Capt., U.S. Navy, Commander; Brent Jett, CDR, U.S. Navy, Pilot; Peter J. K. Wisoff, Civilian, Ph.D., Mission Specialist 1; John M. Grunsfeld, Civilian, Ph.D., Mission Specialist 2; Marsha S. Ivins, Civilian, Mission Specialist 3; and Jerry Linenger, Capt. Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, Mission Specialist 4 (Ascent) and John E. Blaha, Col. USAF Retired, Mission Specialist 4 (Descent). STS-81 was the sixth flight for Mission Specialist 4 (Descent), the fourth flight for the Commander and Mission Specialist 3, the third flight for the Mission Specialist 1, and the second flight for the Pilot, Mission Specialist 2, and Mission Specialist 4 (Ascent).
MISSION SUMMARY
Liftoff of the STS-81 flight occurred on-time at 12:09:27:22.984 G.m.t. (4:27:23 a.m. e.s.t. on January 12, 1997) following a countdown with no unscheduled holds. The ascent trajectory was nominal, and no orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 1 maneuver was required. An evaluation of vehicle performance during ascent was made using vehicle acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the average flight-derived engine specific impulse (lsp) determined for the time period between SRB separation and start of 3-g throttling was 453.59 seconds as compared to the Main Propulsion System(MPS) tag value of 453.18 seconds.
All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected and the launch phase propulsion performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage ascent performance was nominal as was SRB separation, entry, deceleration, and water impact. The SRBs were recovered and returned to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for disassembly and refurbishment. Performance of the SSMEs, ET and MPS was nominal.
The OMS 2 maneuver was initiated at 12:10:10:23.8 G.m.t. [00:00:43:00.9 mission elapsed time (MET)]. The maneuver was 47 seconds in duration and a differential velocity (delta V) of 75.5 ft/sec was imparted to the vehicle.
The payload bay doors were fully open at 12:11:06:53 G.m.t. (00:01:39:26 MET). The door opening was nominal and performed in dual-motor time.
The crew reported that the aft-port latch on the lithium hydroxide (LiOH) stowage door was difficult to open (Flight Problem STS-81-V-01). They were unable to open the latch by hand and a tool was used. The plan was to leave this latch open until entry day. A loads analysis was performed and it showed that the LiOH door with the recumbent seat installed could withstand a 20g crash load with the aft-port latch open.
Fifteen contingency water containers (CWCs) were evacuated in preparation for transfer of water to the Mir. The procedure was begun at 013:02:03 G.m.t. (00:16:35 MET) and completed at 013:03:27 G.m.t. (00:17:59 MET). This procedure was utilized on STS-81 as a result of reports that gas was in the CWCs filled during STS-79.
The rendezvous with the Mir was performed nominally. The Mir approach timing and alignment thruster firings were nominal, and a mechanism roll alignment maneuver of about 1 degree was performed. Post contact thrusting was nominal and full-firing duration occurred. Docking loads were nominal.
The Orbiter clocking system (ODS) avionics hardware performed nominally throughout the docking sequence. The ODS was powered up at 015:03:19:25 G.m.t. (02:17:52:03 MET). Capture occurred nominally at 015:03:54:50 G.m.t. (02:18:27:28 MET). The capture latches were activated at 015:04:02:36 G.m.t. (02:18:35:14 MET), and the docking ring proceeded to the "Final" position that ended the automated docking sequence with a successful Orbiter/Mir docking, which was completed at 015:04:02:43 G.m.t. (02:18:35:21 MET).
Vestibule pressurization occurred at 015:04:29 G.m.t. (02:19:01 MET), cabin pressure equalization with Mir was begun at 015:05:32 G.m.t. (02:20:04 MET), and hatch opening occurred at 015:05:57 G.m.t. (02:20:29 MET).
At approximately 015:14:42 G.m.t. (03:05:15 MET), excessive drift rates and drift-rate trending were observed on the inertial measurement unit (IMU) 3 X- and Y-axes (Flight Problem STS-81-V-02). The performance signature was similar to that seen previously, and the cause has been inadequate or contaminated lubrication in the vertical (x-y axis) gyro. To preserve IMU 3 for use during entry and landing, the crew switched the IMU to standby at 017:14:33 G.m.t. (05:05:05 MET). This action was expected to maintain the X- and Y-axis gyro drift rate at about its pre-shutdown value. The IMU was switched to operate on entry day at 022:06:21 G.m.t. (09:20:54 MET), and the IMU performed satisfactorily throughout entry and landing.
The fuel cell 1 calculated performance (differential voltage) started degrading at a faster-than-normal rate at 017:01:01 G.m.t. (04:15:33 MET) (Flight Problem STS-81-V-03). The degradation rate shifted from a nominal value of approximately 0.008 V/hr to a rate of 0.018 V/hr. As a result, the third on-orbit purge was performed on all three fuel cells at 017:14:39 G.m.t. (05:05:11 MET). Fuel cell 1 recovered some of its performance after this third purge, but it still appeared to be lower-than-normal. Consequently, an additional (manual) purge of only fuel cell 1 was performed at 017:14:52 G.m.t. (05:05:24 MET). This additional purge did not appear to change the performance level of fuel cell 1. As a precaution, main busses A and B were tied prior to the upcoming sleep period.
A comparison of the fuel cell 1 voltage to the main bus A voltage indicated that the fuel cell 1 voltage was reading 0.1 to 0.5 V low, which was determined to be the cause of the erroneous calculated degradation rate. When main bus A voltage was plotted against the fuel cell 1 predicted performance, the performance appeared nominal. The fuel cell 1 voltage continued throughout the flight to read lower than normal and the reading remained erratic. The main bus A voltage and other parameters continued to verify that fuel cell 1 was healthy, which indicated that the erratic fuel cell 1 voltage indication was an instrumentation problem. Main busses A and B were untied at 019:01:58 G.m.t. (06:16:30 MET) after it was determined that the drop in fuel cell 1 performance was due to instrumentation and not a problem with the fuel cell.
The STS-4 payload general support computer (PGSC) was used for both Development Test Objective (DTO) 700-12 [Global Positioning System/lnertial Navigation System (GPS/INS)] and RME 1318 (TVIS). The crew reported that the STS-4 PGSC did not recognize the GPS/INS flash-card in the lower slot of that machine (Flight Problem STS-81-F-03). Suspecting a problem with the STS-4 PGSC, the crew checked for TVIS data that was recorded earlier in the flight and did not find any data. The cause of these problems will require postflight evaluation to determine if the PGSC was at fault. As a result of the TVIS data not being found, RME 1318 was re-accomplished later in the flight, and the data were recorded and downlinked to the ground controllers and sponsor for evaluation.
During docked operations with the Mir, sixteen CWCs were filled and transferred. The total water transfer was 1608 lb.
Orbiter/Mir hatch closure was completed at 019:12:46 G.m.t. (07:03:19 MET). All activities and operations associated with the hatch closure were nominal.
The undocking, fly-around, and separation from the Mir were accomplished nominally, beginning at approximately 020:02:13 G.m.t. (07:16:45 MET). The ODS performed nominally during undocking operations. The ODS was powered up at 020:01:46 G.m.t. (07:16:18 MET) and powered down at 020:02:24 G.m.t. (07:16:56 MET).
A time executed command (TEC) was uplinked at 020:01:39 G.m.t. (07:16:11 MET) (Flight Problem STS-81-V-05). The TEC failed to toggle the Ku-band extravehicular activity (EVA) protect mode bit in the Ku-band/S-band control word at its scheduled time of 020:02:20 G.m.t. (07:16:52 MET). The command had been sent to disable the EVA protect mode. This problem appears to be the result of an incomplete implementation of Ku-band crew member protection flight software change, which added a Ku-band EVA protect mode capability to the flight software (FSW). Using this feature, the ground can define a protected "area" for an EVA crewman (or for the Mir as was the case during this mission) using Orbiter pitch and roll angles. If the Ku-Band antenna points into this protected area while the mode is enabled, the FSW turns off the Ku-band traveling wave tube (TWT), thus preventing the Ku-band antenna from radiating while in the protected area. The command was subsequently sent not using a TEC and the EVA protect mode was disabled.
The flight control system (FCS) checkout was performed using APU 3. The APU and hydraulics subsystems performed nominally during the checkout. APU 3 was started at 21:05:34:39 G.m.t. (08:20:07:17 MET) and ran for 3 minutes 54 seconds. The fuel consumption during this run was 14 lb. No water spray boiler operation occurred because of the short APU run time. FCS performance was nominal.
Primary reaction control system (RCS) thruster F3F failed off at 21:06:28:28 G.m.t. (08:21:01:06 MET) on the first attempted firing during the RCS hot-fire (Flight Problem STS-81-V-06). The maximum chamber pressure achieved was 16.3 psia. The pressure signature, along with the fuel/oxidizer injector temperature profile, was typical of an oxidizer-valve failing to open completely because of iron-nitrate contamination. This was the sixth flight of this thruster in the F3F position and the thruster had accumulated 10 pulses for a total firing time of 5 seconds since being installed. The thruster was leak-free and remained deselected for the remainder of the flight. All other thrusters functioned nominally during the hot-fire.
The payload bay doors were closed at 022:09:01:41 G.m.t. (09:23:34:18 MET) in preparation for landing. The first landing opportunity at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) was waved off because of forecast and observed unacceptable cloud cover. The dual-engine deorbit maneuver for the second landing opportunity at the KSC SLF was performed on orbit 160 at 022:13:17:33.2 G.m.t. (10:03:50:10.2 MET). The maneuver was 202.5 seconds in duration with a delta V of 355.8 ft/sec.
Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred on concrete runway 33 at 022:14:22:46 G.m.t. (10:04:55:23 MET) on January 22, 1997. The Orbiter drag chute was deployed at 022:14:22:46.3 G.m.t. and the nose gear touchdown occurred 9.7 seconds later. The drag chute was jettisoned at 022:14:23:25.5 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at 022:14:23:51 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The flight duration was 10 days 04 hours 55 minutes and 23 seconds. The APUs were shut down 20 minutes 26 seconds after landing.
Approximately 14 minutes after wheels stop, the APU 3 gas generator chamber pressure measurement shifted downward about 200 psi (Flight Problem STS-81-V-07). The cause of this shift was determined to be a failure within the transducer.
PAYLOADS AND EXPERIMENTS
Valuable scientific data were returned from the Shuttle-Mir Science Program in the areas of advanced technology, Earth sciences, fundamental biology, human life sciences, microgravity and space sciences. These investigations provided valuable information about space flight and long-term exposure to the micro-gravity environment. In addition, the commercially initiated research and technology evaluated new technologies and techniques using the Mir Space Station as a test bed.
SPACEHAB SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS
The Spacehab systems operated flawlessly throughout the mission. Spacehab tear-down was late on flight day 10 with closeout occurring prior to the deorbit preparation activities.
A two-hour time period on flight day 9 provided a validation of the Spacehab 32 kbps data stream capability of the Spacehab. The use of this system is planned for future flights.
Biorack
All eleven of the Biorack experiments were completed. The preliminary science-gain assessment for the 11 experiments is:
a. FO-01 Fungus - 90 percent - Reduced time due to flight day 4 docking;
b. FO-02 Cress - 80 percent - Reduced time due to flight day 4 docking;
c. FO-03 Chara - <100 percent - Reduced time due to flight day 4 docking;
d. FO-04 Dosimetry - > 90 percent - Meter 6 loss after PGSC crash/reboot;
e. FO-05 Biofilm -100 percent
f. FO-06 Isozyme -100 percent
g. FO-07 Osteogene - > 90 percent - Reduced time due to flight day 4 docking;
h. FO-08 Sperm -100 percent
i. FO-09 Preplastid - >100 percent j. FO-010 Aggs -100 percent
k. FO-011 Gravity->100 percent
Other problems reported with the Biorack involved a fixative leak in FO-02 Cress operations. Leak cleanup procedures were reviewed by the Surgeon and implemented by the crew without incident.
The PGSC experienced six lock-ups during the course of the mission. The symptom was a single-event upset resulting in a parity bit error. The suspected cause was a combination of cosmic radiation and a PGSC memory intensive application such as Biorack. Following the lock-ups, the data from the Meter 6, Dosimetry Telescope (DOSTEL) investigation became static. Data recovery was accomplished by reseating the data connector. After the sixth lock-up, the Meter 6 data was switched to Incubator A position which was not connected to the PGSC, and Meter 6 data were no longer downlinked but stored on internal memory.
Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus
Two Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA) units were maintained in the powered configuration and placed in the Spacehab for return to Earth. The units operated nominally.
Biotechnology System
Two Biotechnology Systems (BTS) units were maintained in the powered state when returned from the Mir to Earth. All operations continued to be nominal during the return.
MIDDECK SCIENCE AND PAYLOADS
Surface Sampler Kit/Microbial Air Sampler
Air and surface samples were collected for this experiment. These were returned to Earth for postflight analysis. The results of the analysis will be published in separate documentation.
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor
The active monitor and passive foil detectors of the Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM) experiment were initially deployed at the nominally planned stations. The active monitor location was changed four times. The final active monitor was located in the Shuttle airlock.
During deactivation, the crew reported that the green power light emitting diode (LED) was off. Orbiter power problems were eliminated since other payloads tied to the same power bus were operating nominally. Power cycling the unit failed to light the LED. No data loss occurred because of the LED anomaly.
The CREAM recorded heavy ions that penetrate the structure as a function of location, time, and orbital attitude. The results of this experiment will be used in updating environmental models, understanding the effects on the human body, and in the design of structures and electronics.
RISK MITIGATION EXPERIMENTS
RME 1302 - Electric Fields High Inclination/Mir
The set-up and activation of this RME on the Mir was performed in accordance with the scheduled time-line, and data collection lasted for approximately 15 hours. An alternate power cable was used to power the spectrum analyzer when the cable that was called out in the procedures could not be located. Data were also collected on the Orbiter during flight day 9, after which the RME was deactivated and stowed.
RME 1303-1 - Enhanced Dynamics Load Sensor
The transfer of Enhanced Dynamics Load Sensor (EDLS) replacement hardware was nominal. Photographs were taken of the EDLS foot restraints with an astronaut in place to document placement and evaluate if the video angles will be available to complete the Mir EDLS experiment.
RME 1303-2 - Mir Auxiliary Sensor Unit for Mir Structural Dynamics Experiment
The Mir Auxiliary Sensor Unit for Mir Structural Dynamics Experiment (MISDE) hardware was transferred to the Mir.
RME 1303-3 - Water Experiment Kit
Water Experiment Kit (WEK) 2 was transferred to the Mir, and WEK 1 was returned from the Mir. WEK 2 will be used during the next phase of the Mir mission and returned to Earth on a subsequent mission.
RME 1307 - Optical Properties Monitor
The Optical Properties Monitor (OPM) system hardware was successfully transferred to the Mir Krystall module for storage until deployment during an EVA later in the Mir operations. The OPM will be used to collect environmental data from around the Mir.
RME 1317 - MISDE Joint Operations
The MISDE joint operations during the docked phase were successfully performed. These operations included a Mir thruster firing, Mir treadmill crew exercise, Orbiter RCS thruster firing, intravehicular crew push-off activities, and day/night/day transitions. Negotiations prior to the Mir thruster firing test resulted in a request to align the Kvant-2 module solar array parallel to the Kvant-2 long axis. Also a request to repeat the Mir thruster firing test to capture Mir accelerometer data was initially accepted, but the test was not performed because of the Shuttle crew workload.
RME 1318 - Treadmill Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System
The Treadmill Vibration Isolation and Stabilization System (TVIS) was successfully completed and the required data were obtained. However, in completing this RME, some problems were encountered and these are discussed in the following paragraphs.
During the initial setup of the TVIS, it was noted that a mismatch existed between the Orbiter power cables and the treadmill electronics box power input connectors. Since the pin locations in a TVIS connector did not correspond to the appropriate pin locations in the Orbiter power cable, the IFM procedure provided instructions for the installation of jumper wires between the power cable and the TVIS connector, as well as the direction for securing the jumpers and the cable to prevent inadvertent disconnection. This IFM was completed and power was provided to the TVIS.
A number of real-time operations were also completed to enhance system operation and these included:
a. Adjustment of retaining pin on the RME frame for a more secure fit;
b. Relocation of a write-protect switch on the treadmill CCM cards to allow data storage; and
c. Update of a TVIS configuration file default values to allow PGSC PCMCIA card data storage.
The initial results indicate more oscillations than expected at walking speeds. The recorded data included treadmill exercise data, TVIS force transmission data, and TVIS camera target video motion data that was used for postflight evaluation.
During an attempt to downlink the data recorded during the initial TVIS session, it was discovered that no data were recorded on the PGSC PCMCIA card that was used to store data. A further investigation concluded that the PGSC (STS 4) used during the TVIS operation had malfunctioned. As a result, a plan was developed and approved by the Mission Management Team (MMT) that the crew would repeat the TVIS operations immediately after undocking and still maintain the landing on the nominal timeline.
The TVIS hardware was subsequently unstowed and assembled for the second TVIS operation on three test subjects. PGSC STS 5 recorded the data during the second TVIS operation. Also, TVIS software changes were made to move configuration files into the correct directory to avoid a problem encountered during the first TVIS run. The TVIS operations were completed and the data were downlinked via the Orbiter Communications Adapter (OCA) and confirmed as being good-quality data.
A noise that was believed to be a gyro causing the stabilizer springs to resonate was determined to be of no impact to the test. The TVIS hardware demonstrated a stable platform with a minor pitch oscillation associated with fore-aft shifting of the runner on the running surface. Preliminary analysis of the downlinked data show that a force of less than 1 lb was imparted during the steady-state walking/running. With the gyroscope not functioning, the TVIS provided, as expected, a larger roll disturbance which had a magnitude that was dependent on the running style and lateral displacement of the foot falls from the treadmill center-line.
RME 1324 - Volatile Organic Analyzer
The Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) was powered at 12:14:45 G.m.t (00:05:18 MET) and system bake-out proceeded as planned for the seven-hour period. As the crew proceeded with the warm-up of the instrument, the VOA display did illuminate. Power profiles during the bake-out indicated the system was operating nominally until a current drop was observed. Power was removed from the system, and discussions were held with the hardware developer that confirmed that a suspected 3-ampere fuse had blown. The fuse was inaccessible and also there was no spare onboard the vehicle. A decision was made to declare the hardware failed and no attempt at further troubleshooting was made.
The VOA is currently scheduled to fly on STS-84, as International Space Station hardware, to test the Orbiter and Mir air quality.
RME 1325 - Water Quality Monitor
The total organic carbon (TOC) supply kit and analyzer were deployed in the Spacehab. Control analysis of all standards to evaluate the performance of the International Space Station prototype hardware was successfully completed. The results were within the preflight predictions, thus demonstrating efficient Water Quality Monitor operation. Additionally, three Mir water samples were collected and will be analyzed during the postflight analysis operations.
CREW MEDICAL RESTRAINT SYSTEM
The crew medical restraint system (CMRS) was deployed and the first subject was secured in 56 seconds using one medical officer. The deployment and restraint required two minutes and this more than satisfied the requirement. The crew reported no problems with the procedures and setup.
SPACE STATION CREW MIDDECK INTERFACE FUNCTIONALITY
The Space Station Crew Middeck Interface Functionality (SSCIF) was connected to the 1553 PGSCs for data collection during overnight periods while docked. The data collected are being analyzed during postflight operations to determine the extent of radiation upsets that occurred during operations.
KIDSAT PROJECT
The KidSat payload operations were very successful. The preflight plan was to take 287 photographs with the Electronic Still Camera (ESC); however, excellent coordination between all parties involved in the KidSat operations resulted in 525 photographs being taken. A total of 304 of the photographs were taken prior to docking and 221 after docking.
Three error messages were received and these indicated no communication between the ESC and the OCA. The first instance occurred early in the mission when the AC utility power was off. The power was restored, but the images were noisy. The second and third instances occurred about 4 hours later, when after the second message the KidSat software was restarted and this caused the third message. A checkout procedure was uplinked to the crew and after two attempts of the procedure, success was achieved and the KidSat software was restarted. The procedure required disconnection of the Global Positioning System interface, rebooting of the OCA, and restarting the software. KidSat reported 24 Mb of lost memory storage on the PCMCIA card, and this condition may have been caused by the GPS interface. A backup PCMCIA card was successfully used for the remainder of the mission.
MIDCOURSE SPACE EXPERIMENT
The Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) was unable to acquire any data takes as there were no conjunctions between the MSX and the Orbiter.
SPACE ACCELERATION MEASUREMENTS SYSTEM
The Space Acceleration Measurements Experiment (SAMS) hardware was a part of the resupply hardware to the Mir. The hardware was transferred as planned.
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
All Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) subsystems performed nominally and no in-flight anomalies were identified. Analysis of the flight data and assessment of the postflight condition of the recovered hardware indicate subsystem performance was nominal.
The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal, and no SRB Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specification Document (OMRSD) violations occurred. For this flight, the high-pressure heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was used to maintain the case/nozzle joint temperatures within the required LCC limits.
Both SRBs were successfully separated from the External Tank (ET) at liftoff plus 125.723 seconds. The right SRB main parachute no. 3 failed during entry because of its entanglement of the canopy ribbons with the vent line. This problem did not impact entry and water impact operations. The SRBs were retrieved and towed back to shore, and returned to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for disassembly and refurbishment.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
The Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) performed satisfactorily, and all parameters were well within the allowable performance envelopes and typical of the performance observed on previous missions. There were no LCC violations nor were any in-flight anomalies identified.
All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits throughout the countdown. The RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) was 63° F at liftoff.
Motor performance parameters were within contract end item (CEI) specification limits. One out-of-family condition was noted on the pressure trace shape variation during the 0- to 55-second time period, but the variation was well within limits. The calculated PMBT was 63° F at the time of launch. The maximum trace shape variation of pressure versus time during the 62-80 second time period was calculated to be 0.32 percent for the left motor and 1.45 percent for the right motor. These values were well within the 3.2 percent allowable limits.
The RSRM propulsion parameters are shown in the following table.
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter / Left motor, 63° F: Predicted / Actual / Right motor, 63° F: Predicted / Actual
Impulse gates
I-20, 10 to sixth power Ibf-sec / 65.14 / 64.35 / 65.02 / 64.27
I-60, 10 to sixth power Ibf-sec / 173.85 / 173.53 / 173.57 / 173.97
l-AT, 10 to sixth power Ibf-sec / 296.78 / 296.55 / 296.60 / 297.22
Vacuum Isp, Ibf-sec/lbm / 268.4 / 268.2 / 268.4 / 269.0
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60° F at 625 psia / 0.3687 / 0.3682 / 0.3685 / 0.3684
Burn rate, in/sec @ 63° F at 625 psia / 0.3695 / 0.3690 / 0.3693 / 0.3692
Event times, seconds (a) /
Ignition interval / 0.232 / N/A / 0.232 / N/A
Web time (b) /110.5 / 110.7 / 110.6 / 110.3
50 psia cue time / 120.3 / 120.7 / 120.4 / 120.5
Action time (b) / 122.4 / 122.9 / 122.5 / 123.2
Separation command / 125.3 / 125.6 / 125.3 / 125.6
PMBT, °F / 63 / 63 / 63 / 63
Maximum ignition rise rate, psia/10 ms / 90.4 / N/A/ 90.4 / N/A
Decay time, seconds (59.4 psia to 85 K) / 2.8 / 2.9 / 2.8 / 3.5
Tailoff Imbalance: Predicted / Actual
Impulse differential, Klbf-sec / N/A / 286.9
Impulse Imbalance = Integral of the absolute value of the left motor thrust minus right motor thrust from web time to action time.
(a) AII times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a b.
(b) Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval).
Field joint heaters operated for 12 hours 49 minutes during the launch countdown. Power was applied to the heating elements an average of 31 percent of the time to maintain the field joints in their normal operating range.
Igniter joint heaters operated 17 hours 47 minutes during the countdown. Power was applied to the heating elements 68 percent of the time to maintain the joints within the normal operating range.
The aft skirt purge operated for a total of 27 hours 42 minutes. During the countdown, the aft skirt purge was used to maintain the nozzle/case joint temperatures above the minimum LCC temperature. During the LCC time frame, the nozzle/case joint sensor temperatures ranged from 80 to 85° F and 77 to 80° F for the left and right motors, respectively. The calculated flex bearing mean bulk temperature was 79° F.
EXTERNAL TANK
All External Tank (ET) objectives and requirements associated with propellant loading and flight operations were met, and no in-flight anomalies were identified. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated satisfactorily. The ET purge and heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. No ET LCC or OMRSD violations were identified.
No unexpected ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the countdown. Also, no ice or frost were observed on the acreage areas of the ET. Normal quantities of ice or frost were present on the liquid oxygen (LO2) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) feedlines, the pressurization line brackets, and along the LH2 protuberance airload (PAL) ramps. All observations were acceptable per NSTS 08303. In addition, the Ice/Frost Red Team reported that no anomalous conditions existed.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and flight. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the period of the ullage pressure slump was 13.8 psid, which was well within the experience base.
The ET separation was performed satisfactorily, and the ET entry and breakup were within 8 nmi. of the preflight predicted impact print.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES
All Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) parameters were normal throughout the prelaunch countdown and were typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights. Engine ready was achieved at the proper time; all LCC were met; and engine start and thrust buildup were normal. No in-flight anomalies were identified.
Flight data indicate that the SSME performance during mainstage, throttling, shutdown, and propellant dump operations was normal. Cutoff times for SSMEs 1, 2, and 3 were 518.13, 518.25, and 518.37 seconds, respectively. The lsp was rated as 453.59 seconds based on trajectory data. Controller and software performance were nominal.
The high pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures were well within specification throughout engine operation. There were no failures, and no significant SSME problems were identified.
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as scheduled during the countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were armed and system inhibits were turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS measurements indicated that the system operated as expected throughout the launch countdown and flight.
As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and the SRB system power was turned off prior to SRB separation. The ET system has been deleted.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was nominal. No LCC or OMRSD violations occurred, nor were any in-flight anomalies identified.
All events and sequences were performed nominally. The aft hazardous gas concentration during loading were nominal. Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the Orbiter aft compartment (occurred shortly after start of fast-fill) was approximately 130 ppm, which compares favorably with previous data for this vehicle.
LH2 propellant loading was performed as planned with no stop-flows or reverts. A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus the inventory (planned) loads resulted in a loading accuracy of -0.01 percent for LH2 and +0.02 percent for LO2. The total LH2 load was 231,307 Ibm, and the total LH2 load was 1,388,502 Ibm.
Data from the ascent phase indicate that the LO2 and LH2 pressurization and feed systems performed as planned, and all net positive suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the period of ullage-pressure slump was 13.8 psia. The GO2 fixed-orifice pressurization system performed as predicted. Reconstructed data from the engine as well as MPS parameters matched the actual ET ullage pressure measurements.
All three flow control valves (FCVs) performed nominally. The engine 1 FCV had 44 cycles, which was the most of any of the three systems.
Helium system performance for the SSME and pneumatic helium systems was nominal. Entry helium usage was 59.6 Ibm, which is within the requirements. All other parameters were also nominal.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) performed nominally with the exception of primary RCS thruster F3F, which failed off (Flight Problem STS-81-V-06) during the hot-fire test following the FCS checkout. This anomaly is discussed further in a later paragraph.
A total of 4510.9 Ibm of propellants were consumed from the RCS tanks during the mission. In addition, 2410.9 Ibm of propellants were consumed from the OMS tanks during the mission.
The RCS maneuvers performed to rendezvous with the Mir are shown in the following table.
RCS RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS
Maneuver / G.m.t/MET / delta V, ft/sec
NC-3 / 013:11:37:23 G.m.t., 01:02:10:01 MET / 2.9
NC-4 / 014:02:35:21 G.m.t., 01:17:07:59 MET / 3.3
NH / 015:00:16:12 G.m.t., 02:14:48:50 MET / 1.3
MC-1 / 015:01:36:06 G.m.t., 02:16:08:44 MET / 0.7
MC-2 / 015:02:06:16 G.m.t., 02:16:38:54 MET / 0.7
MC-3 / 015:02:16:00 G.m.t., 02:16:48:38 MET / 0.2
+X Separation / 020:04:02:00 G.m.t., 07:18:34:38 MET / 3.0
Primary RCS thruster F3F failed off at 021:06:28:28 G.m.t. (08:21:01:06 MET) on the first attempted firing during the RCS hot-fire (Flight Problem STS-81-V-06). The maximum chamber pressure achieved was 16.3 psia. The pressure signature, along with the fuel/oxidizer injector-temperature profile, was typical of an oxidizer-valve failing to open completely because of iron-nitrate contamination. This was the sixth flight of this thruster in the F3F position and the thruster had accumulated 10 pulses for a total firing time of 5 seconds since being installed. The thruster was leak-free and remained deselected for the remainder of the flight. All other thrusters functioned nominally during the hot-fire. Thruster F3F as well as the other three thrusters (F3L, F3U, and F3D) on the same manifold were removed and replaced during postflight turnaround activities.
During the NC-3 +X RCS maneuver that was performed at 013:11:37:23 G.m.t. (01:02:10:00 MET) transients were observed in the thruster R3A chamber pressure trace; however, these were attributed to operating in the left-QMS interconnect configuration, and were not abnormal.
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The OMS performed nominally throughout the mission with no in-flight anomalies identified. The OMS 1 maneuver was not performed because of the nominal direct-ascent trajectory flown. The following table lists the pertinent information concerning the OMS maneuvers.
OMS MANEUVERS
OMS firing / Engine / Ignition time, G.m.t./MET / Firing duration, seconds / delta V, ft/sec
OMS 2 / Both / 012:10:10:23.3 G.m.t., 00:00:43:00.3 MET / 47.6 / 75
OMS 3 / Both / 012:13:03:03.3 G.m.t., 00:03:35:40.3 MET / 51.4 / 82
OMS 4 NC-2 / Right / 013:01:02:27.8 G.m.t., 00:15:35:04.8 MET / 10.0 / 8.0
OMS-5 / Both / 014:09:10:44.1 G.m.t., 01:23:43:21.1 MET / 58.5 / 94
OMS-6 NC-6 / Both / 014:23:41:15.6 G.m.t., 02:14:13:52.6 MET / 63.3 / 103
OMS-7 Tl / Left / 015:01:13:54.1 G.m.t., 02:15:46:31.1 MET / 12.0 / 9.5
OMS-8 Orbit adjust / Both / 020:13:53:53.2 G.m.t., 08:04:26:30.2 MET / 25.6 / 42.7
Deorbit / Both / 022:13:17:33.2 G.m.t., 10:03:50:10.2 MET / 202.6 / 355.8
All prelaunch operations were nominal. Systems temperatures and pressures were within expected ranges and system valves operated as commanded.
OMS propellant consumption during the mission was 20,204.7 Ibm of which 12,606.5 Ibm was oxidizer and 7598.2 Ibm was fuel. There were two periods of interconnect operation (one left and one right), during which 2420.9 Ibm (20.73 percent) of the OMS propellants were consumed by the RCS.
Evaluation of the inlet pressures, chamber pressures and regeneration jacket temperatures for both orbital maneuvering engines (OMEs) showed nominal performance. The OMS firing times and propellant consumption were consistent with predictions, and this also verified proper operations.
Following the OMS 2, OMS 3 and OMS 4 maneuvers, the left-hand fuel-tank total-quantity gauging system failed to indicate the forward total quantity level. However, during the OMS 5 maneuver, the gauging system began indicating the correct level after regaining the forward probe signal and remained active for the remainder of the mission. This fuel-tank gauging system has exhibited similar behavior on STS-71, STS-76, and STS-79. On STS-74, nominal performance was not regained following the OMS 5 maneuver. An intermittent condition is suspected in the system associated with the totalizer/forward probe.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performance was nominal throughout the STS-81 mission. The PRSD subsystem supplied the fuel cells with 2671 Ibm of oxygen and 336 Ibm of hydrogen for the production of 3862 kWh of electrical energy. In addition, the environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) was supplied with 152 Ibm of oxygen, which includes 57.7 Ibm furnished to the Mir Space Station. A three-day mission extension was possible at the average power level with the reactants remaining at landing.