Space Shuttle NASA Mission Reports: 1998 Missions, STS-89, STS-90, STS-91, STS-95, STS-88
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), World Spaceflight News
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April 1998
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
INTRODUCTION
The STS-89 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report presents a discussion of the Orbiter subsystem operation and the in-flight anomalies that were identified during this eighth Mir rendezvous mission. The report also summarizes the mission activities and presents a summary of the External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) performance during this eighty-ninth mission of the Space Shuttle Program. STS-89 was the sixty-third flight since the return to flight, and the twelfth flight of the OV-105 (Endeavour) Orbiter vehicle.
The flight vehicle consisted of the OV-105 Orbiter; an ET that was designated ET-90; three block MA SSMEs that were designated as serial numbers (S/N) 2043, 2044, and 2045 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBs that were designated BI-093. The two RSRMs were designated RSRM 064 with one installed in each SRB. The individual RSRMs were designated 360T064A for the left SRB, and 360T064B for the right SRB.
The STS-89 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program requirements as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VII, Appendix E. The requirement is that each organizational element supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware and software evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objectives of the STS-89 flight were to rendezvous and dock with the Mir Space Station, and perform the exchange of a Mir astronaut. A double Spacehab module and the crew compartment carried science experiments and hardware, Risk Mitigation Experiments (RMEs), Russian Logistics, Astroculture (AST), two Mechanics of Granular Materials (MGM), Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM), and Space Acceleration Measurement system (SAMS) in support of the Phase 1 Program requirements. As a payload of opportunity, the requirements for the Shuttle Ionospheric Modification with Pulsed Local Exhaust (SIMPLEX) were performed. In addition, the secondary objectives of this flight were to perform the requirements of Get-Away Special (GAS), Closed Equilibrated Biological Aquatic System (CEBAS), Human Performance (HP), and Microgravity Plant Nutrient Experiment (MPNE).
The STS-89 mission was a planned 9-day plus 1 day plus 2-contingency-day mission during which logistics for the Mir station would be transferred and experiments would be performed. The plus 1 day provided an opportunity for docking on flight day 4 should the phasing angle or other problems have prevented the docking on flight day 3. The two contingency days were available for bad weather avoidance for landing, or other Orbiter contingency operations. There were five docked days with the Mir. The STS-89 sequence of events is shown in Table I, and the Space Shuttle Vehicle Engineering Office (SSVEO) In-Flight Anomaly List is shown in Table II. Appendix A lists the sources of data, both informal and formal, that were used in the preparation of this report. Appendix B provides the definitions of all acronyms and abbreviations used in this report. All times are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission elapsed time (MET).
The eight crewmembers of the STS-89 mission consisted of Terrence W. Wilcutt, Lt. Col., U.S. Marine Corps, Commander; Joe Frank Edwards, Jr., Commander, U.S. Navy, Pilot; James F. Reilly, II, Ph.D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 1; Michael P. Anderson, Major, U.S. Air Force, Mission Specialist 2; Bonnie J. Dunbar, Ph.D., Civilian, Payload Commander and Mission Specialist 3; Salizhan Shakirovich Sharipov, Russian Cosmonaut, Mission Specialist 4; Andrew S.W. Thomas , Ph.D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 5 (ascent through docking with the Mir); and David A. Wolf, M. D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 6 (docking through landing). STS-89 was the fifth Shuttle space flight for Mission Specialist 3, the third Space Shuttle flight for the Commander and Mission Specialist 6 (descent), the second Space Shuttle flight for Mission Specialist 5 (ascent), and the first Space Shuttle flight for the Pilot, Mission Specialist 1, Mission Specialist 2, and Mission Specialist 4.
MISSION SUMMARY
The STS-89 vehicle was launched on time at 023:02:48:15.017 G.m.t. (9:48:15 p.m. e.s.t.) on January 22, 1998, after a flawless countdown with no unplanned holds. The ascent was nominal and only one Orbiter problem was noted from the data analysis. An analysis of vehicle performance during ascent was made using vehicle acceleration and preflight propulsion data. From these data, the average flight-derived engine specific impulse (lsp) for the time period between SRB separation and 3g throttling was 452.8 seconds as compared to a main propulsion system (MPS) tag value of 452.20 seconds.
All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected, and the launch phase performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage ascent performance was as expected. SRB separation, entry, deceleration and water impact occurred as anticipated. Both SRBs were recovered after suffering significant damage at water impact. Performance of the SSMEs, ET and main propulsion system (MPS) was normal.
Data review indicated that following the shutdown of the Space Shuttle main engines (SSMEs), the liquid hydrogen (LH2) 4-inch disconnect failed to close pneumatically within the required time (Flight Problem STS-89-V-02). The actual closing time was 11.75 seconds from signal-to-switch compared to the Operations and Maintenance Requirements Document (OMRSD) File IX requirement of 2.8 seconds maximum (typical times are around 1.7 seconds). The disconnect is commanded closed shortly after main engine cutoff (MECO). The open indicator was not lost until approximately 11.5 seconds later. This coincided with Orbiter umbilical retraction which occurred 11.4 seconds after the MECO command. The initial evaluation indicated that the disconnect closed mechanically in the backup mode as the Orbiter umbilical plate separated from the ET umbilical. This disconnect was replaced during the STS-89 flow as part of the recycle program to eliminate 4-inch disconnects with chrome-flaking problems.
The direct ascent trajectory was nominal; consequently, no orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) -1 maneuver was required. The OMS-2 maneuver was performed at 023:03:30:03.4 G.m.t. [00:41:48.4 mission elapsed time (MET)]. The maneuver was 136 seconds in duration and provided a differential velocity (delta V) of 213.5 ft/sec. The resultant orbit was 163 by 162 nmi.
At approximately 023:03:38 G.m.t. (00:00:50 MET), the backup flight system (BFS) general purpose computer (GPC) was commanding the lower left forward (LLF) S-band antenna, but the upper left forward (ULF) antenna was being selected (Flight Problem STS-89-V-07). At the time, the S-band antenna switch electronics system 2 was being used. After the systems management (SM) GPC was configured and the BFS was taken down, the ULF antenna continued to be selected although the SM GPC was commanding the LLF antenna. The ground controllers subsequently commanded the LLF antenna, but still the ULF antenna was selected. At 023:04:02 G.m.t (00:01:14 MET), the S-band antenna switch electronics system 1 was selected as well as the LLF antenna, and nominal operation was noted. System 2 was reselected for a short time to perform troubleshooting. The crew used the antenna-select panel switch to select each of the eight S-band antennas, and normal operation was noted in all positions. Following this troubleshooting, system 1 was reselected. On flight day 4, system 2 was selected a second time to perform additional troubleshooting to evaluate the capabilities of the GPC to control antenna switching. Again, all operations were nominal. The GPC mode of antenna selection was verified utilizing a multiple stored-program-command to cycle through the switch positions, and no anomalies were noted. Following this troubleshooting, system 1 was reselected. On flight day 7, system 2 was selected again for troubleshooting. Testing of the S-band antenna-switch electronics was performed by selecting the system 2 unit for one orbit. Again, no anomalies were noted. Troubleshooting of the S-band antenna-switch electronics system 2 was again performed on flight day 8 by selecting the system 2 unit for several orbits. All of the GPC commanding was performed properly without repeating the original anomaly. System 1 was reselected for the crew-sleep period and used for the remainder of the mission.
At approximately 023:03:44 G.m.t. (00:00:56 MET), the GPC 3 was reconfigured to a guidance, navigation and control operational sequence 2 (G2) "freeze-dry" GPC. The crew reported that when taking the GPC 3 mode switch from the run to the standby position, there was no detent in the standby position and the switch went into the halt position (Flight Problem STS-89-V-01). Subsequent mode switch changes confirmed that the freeze-dry procedure had failed because GPC put-away processing was not completed when the mode switch was inadvertently taken to halt. On flight day 2, a hardware initiated stand-alone memory (HISAM) dump of the GPC 3 software was performed. Analysis of the dump revealed no GPC hardware failures or primary avionics software system (PASS) problem. GPC 3 was successfully initial program loaded (IPL'ed), moded to run, and added to the redundant set, in which it was running G2 software with GPCs 1 and 2. GPC 2 was subsequently configured as a G2 "freeze-dry" GPC. The GPC 3 mode switch was kept in the run position for the remainder of the mission.
During preparations to gain access to the Spacehab, the crew reported that they were only able to open the D hatch to a position approximately six inches above the support pads on the floor of the airlock. The crew reported interference from a stowage bag and an air duct from the inlet side of the hard duct in the external airlock (Flight Problem STS-89-V-08). The crew removed the stowage bag pallet and disconnected the air duct and completed the opening of the hatch. With the hatch properly opened and stowed, the air duct was reinstalled. The airlock is an International-Space-Station (ISS)-configured external airlock that has electrical shrouds below the forward hatch area. This condition causes the air duct 'tee' to be rotated towards the center of the airlock, thus causing the interference.
At 023:06:37:22.2 G.m.t. (00:03:49:07.2 MET), a dual OMS straight-feed NC 1 rendezvous maneuver was initiated. The maneuver was 34.7 seconds in duration, and a delta V of 56.3 ft/sec was imparted to the vehicle. At 023:18:03:13 G.m.t. (00:15:14:58 MET), a dual OMS straight-feed NC 2 rendezvous maneuver was initiated. The maneuver was 45.3 seconds in duration, and a delta V of 73 ft/sec was imparted to the vehicle. The NPC rendezvous maneuver, scheduled for 023:22:34 G.m.t. (00:19:46 MET), was not required. The reaction control system (RCS), in the multi-axis mode, was used for the NC 3 maneuver. The RCS performed nominally during the 12-second firing, imparting a delta V of 2.9 ft/sec.
The Orbiter docking system (ODS) was powered up for the docking-ring extension at approximately 024:04:25 G.m.t. (01:01:37 MET). The docking ring was extended from the final position to the initial position in preparation for docking with the Russian Mir Space Station. The ODS was powered down at approximately 024:04:33 G.m.t. (01:01:45 MET).
All Orbiter subsystems performed nominally during the successful rendezvous and docking with the Mir Space Station. The following table lists the OMS and RCS maneuvers, as well as the pertinent parameters, that were performed to complete the rendezvous with the Mir Space Station.
The ODS hardware performed nominally throughout the docking sequence. Capture occurred nominally at approximately 024:20:14 G.m.t. (01:17:26 MET) with a closing rate of 0.114 ft/sec and with nominal misalignments. The docking mechanism attenuated the relative motion between the Orbiter and the Mir, retracted the two spacecraft, and the structural hooks were closed at approximately 024:20:23 G.m.t. (01:17:35 MET).
At approximately 026:03:19 G.m.t. (03:00:31 MET), the oxidizer injector temperature on vernier RCS thruster L5D began behaving erratically (Flight Problem STS-89-V-03). The indicated temperature rapidly decreased to below the 130° F leak detection limit, and this resulted in the automatic deselection of thruster L5D by redundancy management (RM). A review of the data confirmed that the erratic temperature indication was an instrumentation problem and not an actual oxidizer leak. The indicated oxidizer injector temperature remained offset-low in the 75 to 125° F range until approximately 026:06:07 G.m.t. (03:03:19 MET) when the measurement recovered. When the failure initially occurred, attitude control of the Orbiter/Mir stack was passed to the Mir. Due to Mir propellant concerns, attitude control was passed back to the Orbiter at approximately 026:07:48 G.m.t. (03:05:00 MET).
To recover partial vernier leak detection using the fuel injector temperature, a GPC memory (GMEM) write procedure was developed to change the oxidizer injector temperature leak detection limit of all vernier thrusters from 130° F to off-scale-low. The GMEM procedure was uplinked to the vehicle at 026:20:57 G.m.t. (03:18:08 MET) after verification was completed in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL). Vernier thruster redundancy management was re-enabled, and vernier leak detection was performed by the on-board system using the only fuel injector temperatures. This same anomaly occurred on STS-68 and STS-67, the seventh and eighth flights of OV-105. Extensive troubleshooting did not duplicate or isolate the anomaly. The thruster was removed and replaced after STS-68.
At 027:02:06 G.m.t. (03:23:18 MET), the reaction jet driver (RJD) forward-2 (F2) F5 remote power controller (RPC) 2 failed off (Flight Problem STS-89-V-04). Shortly after this occurred, vernier thruster F5R was commanded to fire, resulting in an F5R fail-off due to the lack of driver power, and loss of vernier-thruster attitude-control of the mated vehicle. After cycling the vernier driver switch and then turning on the forward reaction jet logic and driver power for the forward primary thrusters, the RJD power was restored. Vernier thruster F5R was re-selected and vernier control of vehicle attitude was reestablished. The fail-off of the reaction jet driver RJD F2 is believed to have been caused by a failure in the latch circuit in the forward load control assembly (FLCA) 3. As a result, the RJD F2 logic power switch for forward RCS manifolds 4 and 5 were left on while the Orbiter was docked to the Mir. The troubleshooting of the failed-off RJD F2 F5 RPC 2 was performed following undocking and the orbit-adjust maneuver. The troubleshooting was initiated by taking the RJD F2 logic power switch to off to test the latch with the vernier driver power. Vernier logic power remained on indicating that the latch was not hard failed. The logic power switch was left off during the crew-awake period and taken back to on during the crew-sleep period.
Troubleshooting of the fail-off of the RJD F2 F5 RPC 2 was also performed for flight day 9. As a part of the post-sleep reconfigurations, troubleshooting was initiated by taking the RJD F2 logic power switch to off to test the latch with the vernier driver power. Vernier logic and driver power failed-off about 39 minutes later, repeating the earlier failure. The crew returned the logic power switch to on about a minute later. Since a forward vernier thruster was not commanded to fire during the time that the logic and driver power was off, vernier control was not lost. Further troubleshooting was terminated, and the logic power switch remained on for the remainder of the mission. During postflight troubleshooting at KSC, the problem was isolated to FLCA 3. The unit was scheduled for replacement.
During the planned RCS regulator reconfiguration, the right RCS fuel helium-isolation-valve B failed to open (Flight Problem STS-89-V-05). The valve position indication (VPI) telemetry indicated that the valve did not move (the close VPI stayed on and the open VPI stayed off), and the crew reported a barberpole talkback. The right RCS helium-pressurization B switch was cycled from open to close and back to the open position; however, the fuel helium-isolation-valve B still did not open. The switch was then taken to close, and the right RCS was returned to the A regulators (the right RCS helium-pressurization A switch was taken to open).
At approximately 028:07:38 G.m.t. (05:04:50 MET), the -Z star tracker annunciated a pressure-fail BITE (Flight Problem STS-89-V-06). The BITE has remained for the remainder of the mission. The star tracker is normally pressurized with argon gas to 17.58 psia to prevent moisture and contamination from entering the star tracker during entry and ground operations. The BITE indicates that the -Z star tracker pressure has leaked below 14.7 psia. There was no impact to flight operations.
All planned equipment transfers to Mir were completed. A total of 16 contingency water containers (CWCs), containing approximately 1615 lb of water, were transferred. Final ODS hatch closure occurred at approximately 028:22:27 G.m.t. (05:19:39 MET).
The ODS performed nominally during the undocking of the Orbiter with the Russian Mir Space Station. The ODS was powered up at approximately 029:16:29 G.m.t. (06:13:41 MET). The structural hooks were activated in the open direction with travel from approximately 92 percent to the nominal 6 percent where the hooks were deactivated. The undocking-complete signal was received at 029:16:57 G.m.t. (06:14:09 MET), and the ODS was powered down 30 minutes later.
The initial separation maneuver using the RCS was initiated at 029:16:57 G.m.t. (06:14:09 MET). The maneuver was approximately 12 seconds in duration and imparted a delta V of 2.8 ft/sec to the Orbiter. Following daylight, a fly-around of the Mir Space Station was performed. The final separation maneuver from the vicinity of the Mir was performed at 029:18:16:37 G.m.t. (06:15:28:22 MET). An orbit-adjust maneuver was performed using the left orbital maneuvering engine (OME). The firing, which was initiated at 029:23:32 G.m.t. (06:20:44 MET), had a duration of 22.4 seconds and imparted a delta V of 18.7 ft/sec.
The RCS hot-fire was performed at approximately 030:14:55 G.m.t. (07:12:07 MET). All primary thrusters fired nominally during the hot-fire. One unusual occurrence was noted when the primary thruster R2D fuel injector temperature dropped to 23° F following its hot-fire. Typically, a fuel injector temperature drops into the 50 to 60° F range. The thruster was not annunciated fail-leak because leak-detection redundancy management (RM) for a fuel leak is 20° F. The injector temperature subsequently recovered, so the thruster was considered to be good and not leaking.
Following the RCS hot-fire, the flight control system (FCS) checkout was performed using APU 1. The FCS, APU 1 and hydraulic system 1 performed nominally during the checkout. APU 1 was started at 030:15:25:31 G.m.t. (07:12:37:16 MET) and ran for 5 minutes 42 seconds with a fuel consumption of 16 lb. No water spray boiler operation occurred due to the short APU run time.
The right OME was fired in support of the Shuttle Ionospheric Modification with Pulsed Local Exhaust (SIMPLEX) payload. The firing, which was initiated at 030:21:50:21 G.m.t. (07:19:02:06 MET), had a duration of 9.2 seconds and imparted a delta V of 8.2 ft/sec to the vehicle.
Development test objective (DTO) 119, the test to obtain thermal data for the airlock external water lines, was successfully completed. Ten hours of an attitude with the top of the Orbiter facing the Sun were flown to obtain these data.
The payload bay doors were closed and latched for landing at 031:18:54:02 G.m.t. (08:16:05:47 MET). The dual-engine deorbit maneuver for the first landing opportunity at the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) was performed on orbit 138 at 031:21:27:55 G.m.t. (08:18:39:40 MET). The maneuver was 204 seconds in duration with a delta V of 340.6 ft/sec.
Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred on KSC concrete runway 15 at 031:22:35:10 G.m.t. (08:19:46:55 MET) on January 31,1998. The Orbiter drag chute was deployed at 031 -.22:35:13 G.m.t. and the nose gear touchdown occurred 8 seconds later. The drag chute was jettisoned at 031:22:35:53 G.m.t. with wheels stop occurring at 031:22:36:21 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The flight duration was 8 days 19 hours 46 minutes 55 seconds. The APUs were shut down 16 minutes 45 seconds after landing.
PAYLOADS AND EXPERIMENTS
The payload and experiment operations were very successful during the STS-89 mission. All planned equipment transfers to and from Mir were completed. In excess of 3578 lb of hardware, equipment and consumables were transferred to the Mir plus 16 contingency water containers (CWCs), containing approximately 1615 lb of water. Approximately 2207 lb were transferred from the Mir to the Orbiter for return.
SPACEHAB OPERATIONS
All Spacehab subsystems performed satisfactorily, and 100 percent of the planned transfer items to the Mir were completed. Approximately 86 percent of the planned return items were transferred to the Spacehab. This reduced amount of transfers resulted from 25 bags containing used food containers, lithium hydroxide canisters, and other return items being deleted from the return list. A stowage reconfiguration plan and center of gravity (c.g.) concerns that resulted from the significant reduction in return items were resolved without any significant problems.
The enhanced Orbiter Refrigerator/Freezer (EOR/F) performed satisfactorily in the freezer mode. The EOR/F was used to stow down-transfer samples and operated nominally.
PHASE 1 PROGRAM SCIENCE
Advanced X-Ray Detector - The Advanced X-Ray Detector (ADV XDT) performed satisfactorily . The unit was deactivated and the powered transfer to the Mir Space Station was completed at 027:20:49 G.m.t. (04:18:01 MET).
Advanced Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus - The Advanced Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA) was transferred in the powered state from the Mir to the Orbiter on flight day 6. Unattended operations for the remainder of the mission were nominal.
Mechanics of Granular Materials - The Mechanics of Granular Material (MGM) encountered a video downlink anomaly shortly after deactivation. This condition was corrected by reconfiguring the video switching unit (VSU). Six samples were processed; however, during the sample 4 deactivation erratic pressure readings (11.4 to 35 psi) were noted. These were believed to be caused by a faulty pressure sensor. Alternate activation and deactivation procedures were implemented and operations were continued for the remainder of the samples. The initial indications are that sample 4 was not compromised and all samples were successfully processed.
MIDDECK SCIENCE AND PAYLOADS
Advanced Astroculture - The Advanced Astroculture (ADV ASC) experiment was transferred to the Mir on flight day 6 without incident.
Biochemistry of Three Dimensional Tissue Biotechnology Refrigerator - The Biochemistry of Three Dimensional Tissue Biotechnology Refrigerator (BIO3D BTR) unit was transferred in the powered condition to the Orbiter middeck on flight day 5. The unit operated nominally for the remainder of the mission.
Thermal Electric Holding Module - The Thermal Electric Holding Module (TEHM) operated nominally. The TEHM was used as a refrigerator (4° C) during ascent and descent for stowage of refrigerated Mir transfer and Shuttle samples.
Thermal Electric Holding Facility - The Thermal Electric Holding Facility (TEHOF) was transferred to the Mir; however, the assembly was not complete. The outer shell installation was completed in the Mir after the Orbiter undocked from the Mir. The unit was stored in the Krystall Module and the necessary Shuttle tools required for installation of the shell were left with the Mir crew for assembly of the experiment.
Closed Equilibrated Biological Aquatic System - The Closed Equilibrated Biological Aquatic System (CEBAS) operated nominally throughout the mission.
Coculture - The Coculture (COCULT) experiment hardware began showing error messages early in the mission. Troubleshooting concluded that a pressure sensor had failed and fresh nutrient media was no longer being infused into the COCULT rotating vessel. A manual infusion procedure was performed by the crew to re-establish an acceptable nutrient balance. An in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure during which an internal inspection of the hardware was performed on flight day 5, and no leaks or definitive cause for the automatic infusion anomaly was found. The hardware was transferred to the Mir on flight day 5.