2011 Federal Debt Limit Extension Controversy: Official Reports, Potential Effects on Government Operations, Treasury Department Assessments and Possible Actions, Federal Debt Management
U.S. Government, U.S. Congress, GAO, Treasury Department
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Chapter 2: Federal Debt: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions: An Update (GAO)
Chapter 5: Debt Management Overview
Chapter 8: Statements by Congressional Republicans on The Debt Limit Issue
Chapter 9: Statements by Congressional Democrats on The Debt Limit Issue
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Report to the Congress - February 2011
GAO-11-203 * United States Government Accountability Office
Letter * Background * Increased Borrowing and Limited Borrowing Capacity Provided by Extraordinary Actions Create Debt Management Challenges * Approaching the Debt Limit Can Add Uncertainty in the Treasury Market * Experts and Practices of Other Countries Offer Insights for Better Linking Policy Decisions with Their Effect on Debt * Conclusions * Matter for Congressional Consideration * Agency Comments * Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology * Appendix II Detailed Methodology and Findings of Statistical Analysis of Treasury Borrowing Costs near the Debt Limit * Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
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Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has prepared this report to assist Congress in identifying and addressing debt management challenges. Since 1995, the statutory debt limit has been increased 12 times to its current level of $14.294 trillion. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) recently notified Congress that the current debt limit could be reached as early as April 5, 2011, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that under current law debt subject to the limit will exceed $25 trillion in 2021.
This report (1) describes the actions that Treasury traditionally takes to manage debt near the limit, (2) analyzes the effects that approaching the debt limit has had on the market for Treasury securities, and (3) describes alternative mechanisms that would permit consideration of the link between policy decisions and the effect on debt when or before decisions are made. GAO analyzed Treasury and market data; interviewed Treasury officials, budget and legislative experts, and market participants; and reviewed practices in selected countries.
What GAO Recommends
To avoid potential disruptions to Treasury markets and help inform fiscal policy decisions in a timely way, Congress should consider ways to better link decisions about the debt limit with decisions about spending and revenue.
Treasury provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The debt limit does not control or limit the ability of the federal government to run deficits or incur obligations. Rather, it is a limit on the ability to pay obligations already incurred.
While debates surrounding the debt limit may raise awareness about the federal government’s current debt trajectory and may also provide Congress with an opportunity to debate the fiscal policy decisions driving that trajectory, the ability to have an immediate effect on debt levels is limited. This is because the debt reflects previously enacted tax and spending policies.
Delays in raising the debt limit create debt and cash management challenges for the Treasury, and these challenges have been exacerbated in recent years by a large growth in debt. In the past, Treasury has often used extraordinary actions, such as suspending investments or temporarily disinvesting securities held in federal employee retirement funds, to remain under the statutory limit. However, the extraordinary actions available to the Treasury have not kept pace with the growth in borrowing needs. For example, unlike the past, the amount potentially provided by the extraordinary actions for 1 month in fiscal year 2010 was less than the monthly increase in debt subject to the limit for most months of the year. As a result, once debt reaches the limit, Congress will likely have less time than in prior years to debate raising the debt limit before there are disruptions to government programs and services. This trend is likely to continue given the long-term fiscal outlook.
Failure to raise the debt limit in a timely manner could have serious negative consequences for the Treasury market and increase borrowing costs. Also, some of the actions that Treasury has taken to manage the amount of debt near the limit add uncertainty to the Treasury market. In the past, Treasury has postponed auctions and dramatically reduced the amount of bills outstanding, which compromised the regularity of auctions and the certainty of supply on which Treasury relies to achieve the lowest borrowing cost over time. GAO’s analysis suggests that borrowing costs modestly increased during debt limit debates in 2002, 2003, and most recently in 2010.
In addition, managing debt near the debt limit diverts Treasury’s limited resources away from other cash and debt management issues at a time when Treasury already faces challenges in lengthening the average maturity of its debt portfolio.
Observers and participants suggested improving the link between the spending and revenue decisions that drive debt and changes in the debt limit. Better alignment could be possible if decisions about the debt level occur in conjunction with spending and revenue decisions as opposed to the after-the-fact approach now used. This practice, which is similar to practices used in some other countries, might facilitate efforts to change the fiscal path by highlighting the implications of tax and spending decisions on changes in debt.
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Abbreviations
BPD Bureau of the Public Debt
CBO Congressional Budget Office
CDS credit default swap
CPFF Commercial Paper Funding Facility
CM bill cash management bill
CSRDF Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund
DISP debt issuance suspension period
ESF Exchange Stabilization Fund
FFB Federal Financing Bank
G-Fund Government Securities Investment Fund of the Federal Employees’ Retirement System
GDP gross domestic product
IMF International Monetary Fund
LIBOR London interbank offer rate
Moody’s Moody’s Investors Service
ODM Office of Debt Management
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFP Office of Fiscal Projections
Recovery Act American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Secretary Secretary of the Treasury
SFP Supplementary Financing Program
SLGS State and Local Government Series
TARP Troubled Asset Relief Program
TIPS Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities
Treasury Department of the Treasury
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index
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Report to the Congress
Congress and the President have enacted laws to establish a limit on the amount of federal debt that can be outstanding at one time. The debt limit does not restrict Congress’ ability to enact spending and revenue legislation that affect the level of debt or otherwise constrain fiscal policy; it restricts the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) authority to borrow to finance the decisions enacted by the Congress and the President. As a result, as the government nears the debt limit, Treasury often must deviate from its normal cash and debt management operations and take a number of extraordinary actions such as temporarily disinvesting securities held as part of federal employees’ retirement plans to meet the government’s obligations as they come due without exceeding the debt limit. Once the extraordinary actions are exhausted, Treasury is not authorized to issue new debt and could be forced to delay payments for government services or operations until funding is available and could eventually be forced to default on legal debt obligations.
Since 1995, the statutory debt limit has been increased 12 times to its current level of $14.294 trillion. Treasury recently notified Congress that the current debt limit could be reached as early as April 5, 2011, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that, if current laws remain in place, debt subject to the limit will exceed $25 trillion in 2021. Meanwhile, GAO’s long-term simulations show that absent policy changes, federal debt will increase continually over the next several decades. The medium- and long-term outlook for the federal budget makes an understanding of the operations and implications of the debt limit important.
GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative as part of a continuing effort to assist Congress in identifying and addressing debt management challenges. This report examines the challenges associated with managing cash and debt near the limit. Specifically, the objectives of this report are to (1) describe the actions that Treasury has taken to manage debt near the limit and challenges that arise, (2) analyze the effects that approaching the debt limit has on the market for Treasury securities, including Treasury’s borrowing costs, and (3) in light of the disconnect between the debt limit and the policy decisions that have an effect on the size of federal debt, describe alternative triggers or mechanisms that would permit consideration of the link between policy decisions and their effect on debt when or before decisions are made.
To answer our first objective, we analyzed publicly available data on Treasury cash and debt transactions from the last 16 years (1995-2010) to identify factors that could create challenges for Treasury in managing debt near or at the limit. We reviewed documents provided by Treasury, interviewed Treasury officials, and obtained estimates of the time and staff involved in planning for when the debt limit will be reached and related operations. We conducted a check for reasonableness of these estimates.
To determine what effect approaching the debt limit had on the Treasury market, we analyzed changes in the size and timing of Treasury auctions when debt was near or at the limit. Our review generally covered the last 16 years—or as many of those years for which data were readily available—in order to include both a particularly disruptive debt limit debate in 1995-1996 that required Treasury to take a number of extraordinary actions and the most recent debt limit increase. We interviewed several market participants and observers, including primary dealers, money market fund managers, and credit rating agencies, to obtain their views on how the debt limit and the actions Treasury takes to manage the amount of debt when it is near the debt limit affect the Treasury market. We analyzed changes in the yields for Treasury securities before, during, and after five of the debt limit debates in the past 10 years, including the most recent in 2009-2010, to determine how proximity to the debt limit affected Treasury’s borrowing costs. See appendix II for more details on how we estimated increased borrowing costs including limitations to our analysis.
To identify alternative triggers or other mechanisms, we interviewed budget and legislative experts including former congressional staff; former CBO, Office of Management and Budget, and Treasury officials; and other congressional observers from a range of policy research organizations. We also reviewed information from select member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and received input from budget or debt office representatives from Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom about mechanisms used in their countries to manage aggregate levels of debt. We selected these countries based on a review of relevant reports and other information published by the OECD and International Monetary Fund (IMF). While selected countries offer illustrative examples, their experiences are not always applicable to the United States given differences in political systems and economies.
To assess the reliability of the data used in this report, including financial markets data downloaded from Thomson Reuters’ proprietary statistical database, Datastream, and IHS Global Insight and publicly available data from Treasury and the Federal Reserve, we examined the data to look for outliers and anomalies and, when possible, compared data from multiple sources for consistency. In general, we chose databases that were commonly used by Treasury and researchers to monitor changes in federal debt and related transactions. On the basis of our assessment we believe the data are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this review.
We conducted our work from December 2009 to January 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
Congress and the President first enacted a statutory limit on federal debt during World War I to eliminate the need for Congress to approve each new debt issuance and provide Treasury with greater discretion over how it finances the government’s day-to-day borrowing needs. Federal debt subject to the limit includes both debt held by the public and debt held by government accounts (intragovernmental debt holdings). The majority of debt held by the public consists of marketable Treasury securities, such as bills, notes, bonds, and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), that are sold through auctions and can be resold by whoever owns them. Treasury also issues a smaller amount of nonmarketable securities, such as savings securities and special securities for state and local governments. Debt held by the public primarily represents the amount the federal government has borrowed to finance cumulative cash deficits. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent balances of Treasury securities held in government accounts such as the Social Security trust funds. It increases when these accounts run a surplus or accrue interest on existing securities.1 Debt subject to the limit increased from roughly $43 billion in 1940 to more than $13,000 billion (or $13 trillion) in 2010.
In the past, Congress has sought to link decisions about the level of debt to those about the level of federal spending and revenue by integrating changes to the debt limit into the larger budget process. For example, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires that Congress include the levels of debt implied by the spending and revenue levels in the budget resolution for the next 5 years and allows for specific estimates of the increase in debt subject to the limit.2 Until recently, the House of Representatives had a rule that automatically generated a joint resolution considered to have been passed in the House changing the debt limit by the amount recommended in the budget resolution for the next fiscal year.3 The Congressional Budget Act as amended also established an alternative procedure for changing the debt limit through reconciliation legislation that is subject to expedited procedures. Despite these rules and procedures, Congress usually votes on the debt limit after fiscal policy decisions affecting federal borrowing have begun to take effect.
Debt limit increases frequently involve protracted debate, regardless of prior votes on the budget resolution or other legislation that increases the need to borrow. This debate often occurs when federal debt is near or at the debt limit. Three pieces of legislation enacted to respond to the financial market crisis and economic downturn are recent exceptions—in each of these the debt limit was increased by roughly the amount the legislation was expected to increase debt. For example, in addition to spending and revenue provisions, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) increased the debt limit by $789 billion from $11,315 billion to $12,104 billion.4 Federal debt at the time of enactment was more than $600 billion below the limit.
Treasury’s normal cash management operations involve ensuring that there is enough cash on hand to pay government obligations as they come due. Treasury has two primary sources of funds to finance these obligations: (1) revenue collections, such as federal tax revenues and other fees the federal government imposes and (2) cash borrowed from the public through auctions of marketable securities. One of Treasury’s goals is to finance the government’s borrowing needs at the lowest cost over time by, among other things, issuing a wide range of securities in a regular and predictable pattern.5 Treasury currently issues bills that mature in a year or less, notes with maturities of 2 to 10 years, and bonds with maturities of greater than 10 years. Treasury also issues 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year TIPS, which offer inflation protection to investors who are willing to pay a premium for this protection in the form of lower interest rates.6 Treasury does not “time the market”—or seek to take advantage of low interest rates—when it issues securities. Instead, Treasury strives to lower its borrowing costs over time by relying on a regular preannounced schedule of auctions.
Treasury holds cash in its operating cash balance in an account at the Federal Reserve and in accounts at depository institutions across the country. Treasury can draw down its operating cash balance as debt approaches the limit, which allows Treasury to temporarily make payments without increasing the amount of debt subject to the limit. However, cash balances in its account at the Federal Reserve must be kept at a sufficient level to avoid overdrawing this account since the Federal Reserve System cannot legally lend directly to the Treasury.
The issuance of cash management bills (CM bills) provides another way for Treasury to manage more closely the amount of additional debt subject to the limit. CM bills are flexible securities that Treasury issues outside of its regular preannounced auction schedule. Treasury sets the amount and time to maturity to meet its immediate borrowing needs at the time.7 Issuing CM bills allows Treasury to borrow cash for shorter periods than regular bills to help manage the uncertainty around the timing of increases to the debt limit. However, our past work showed that Treasury paid a premium, in the form of higher yields, for CM bills relative to regular bills.8
There are also a number of extraordinary actions currently available to Treasury to avoid exceeding the debt limit. These actions reduce uncertainty over future increases in debt subject to the limit or reduce the amount of debt subject to the limit. Table 1 provides an overview of each one. Two of these actions relate to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF), which is the trust fund for two federal retirement plans that hold nonmarketable securities. To take these actions, Treasury must declare in advance a debt issuance suspension period (DISP)—a period in which Treasury determines that it cannot issue debt without exceeding the debt limit. Another four actions can be taken without first declaring a DISP.
Table 1: Extraordinary Actions Taken by Treasury to Manage Debt near the Debt Limit
Extraordinary actions that do not require the declaration of a DISP
Suspension of new issuances of State and Local Government Series (SLGS) Securities
SLGS are special securities offered to state and local governments and other issuers of tax-exempt bonds. Suspending new SLGS issuances reduces uncertainty over future increases in debt subject to the limit. Suspending SLGS issuances eliminates a flexible, low-cost option that state and local government issuers have frequently used when refinancing their existing debt before maturity. Suspending new SLGS issuances is generally the first extraordinary action Treasury takes to manage debt near the debt limit.
Exchanging Federal Financing Bank (FFB) debt for debt subject to the limit
FFB is a government corporation under the general supervision and direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, which borrows from the Treasury to finance purchases of agency debt and agency guaranteed debt. It can also issue up to $15 billion of its own debt—FFB 9(a) obligations—that is not subject to the debt limit. This debt can be exchanged with other federal debt (e.g., securities held by the CSRDF) to reduce the amount of debt subject to the limit.
Suspension of investments to the Government Securities Investment Fund of the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (G-Fund)
The G-Fund contains contributions made by federal employees toward their retirement as part of the Thrift Savings Plan program, which are invested in special one-day nonmarketable Treasury securities that are subject to the limit. As debt nears the limit and the Secretary determines that the G-Fund may not be fully invested without exceeding the debt limit, Treasury can suspend investment for the entire amount or a portion of the G-Fund on a daily basis to reduce debt subject to the limit. Treasury is required to restore lost interest on the G-Fund’s uninvested funds after the debt limit has been increased.
Suspension of Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) Investments
The ESF is used to help provide a stable system of monetary exchange rates. Dollar-denominated assets of the ESF not used for program purposes are generally invested in one-day nonmarketable Treasury securities that are subject to the debt limit. When debt approaches the limit, Treasury can suspend investment for the entire amount or a portion of the ESF’s maturing nonmarketable Treasury securities. Treasury is not authorized to restore lost interest to the ESF when the debt limit is increased.
Extraordinary actions that require the declaration of a DISP
Suspension of new CSRDF investment
Once debt reaches the debt limit, Treasury is able to suspend investment of new receipts to the CSRDF. To do so, Treasury must send a letter notifying Congress that CSRDF receipts cannot be invested without exceeding the debt limit (i.e., declaring a DISP). Treasury is required to make the CSRDF whole after the DISP has ended.
Disinvestment of securities held by CSRDF
Once debt reaches the debt limit, Treasury is able to disinvest Treasury securities held by the CSRDF. To do so, Treasury must send a letter notifying Congress that it will not be able to issue debt securities without exceeding the debt limit and provide the expected length of the DISP, which Treasury uses to determine the amount of CSRDF investments that can be disinvested. Treasury is required to restore lost interest after the DISP has ended.
Since 1995, the debt limit has been increased 12 times. Prior to 6 of these, Treasury had to take one or more extraordinary actions to avoid exceeding the debt limit. •
Prior to five of the six debt limit increases between 1996 and 2006, Treasury took extraordinary actions, including declaring a DISP.
During the period immediately preceding the debt limit increase in August 1997, Treasury did not take any extraordinary actions.
The federal government ran budget surpluses in fiscal years 1998 through 2001. Debt subject to the limit increased by $293 billion during this period, but no increases to the debt limit were required.
During the period immediately preceding the debt limit increase in September 2007, Treasury suspended the issuance of SLGS but did not take any other extraordinary actions or declare a DISP.
In 2008 and 2009, three laws that were expected to increase the amount of debt held by the public included corresponding increases in the debt limit at the time of enactment.
In December 2009 and February 2010, Treasury avoided taking extraordinary actions as debt approached the limit in part by allowing the Treasury securities it issued for the Supplementary Financing Program (SFP)—a temporary program begun in 2008 at the request of the Federal Reserve to drain reserves from the banking system and assist with its emergency liquidity and lending initiatives—to mature without rolling them over.
The 1996 transaction did not involve FFB issuing FFB 9(a) obligations. Instead, FFB exchanged other financial assets—namely loans to federally chartered entities—that were also exempt from the debt limit for securities held by the CSRDF that were subject to the debt limit.
If debt is at the limit and the extraordinary actions are exhausted, Treasury may not issue debt without further action from Congress and could be forced to delay payments until sufficient funds become available. In the past, Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury have taken additional actions beyond those described above when necessary to ensure that the government paid its obligations as they came due without breaching the debt limit. For example, in 1996, Congress passed and the President signed legislation allowing Treasury to issue securities temporarily excluded from the debt limit in an amount equal to the March 1996 Social Security payments to ensure that benefit payments were made on time.
Treasury has never been unable to pay interest or principal on debt held by the public because of the debt limit. Treasury, credit rating agencies, and others agree that failure to pay principal or interest on Treasury securities because of the debt limit could have costly consequences for the U.S. government and financial markets including higher future borrowing costs for Treasury and the public; stress on the value of the dollar in currency markets; and major disruptions in capital markets due to the repricing of products, services, and transactions dependent on an efficiently functioning Treasury market.
Increased Borrowing and Limited Borrowing Capacity Provided by Extraordinary Actions Create Debt Management Challenges
Extraordinary Actions Provide Less Borrowing Capacity Relative to Borrowing Needs Than They Did in the Past
The borrowing capacity provided by the extraordinary actions has grown in size but has not kept pace with the growth in Treasury’s borrowing needs. The amount potentially provided by the extraordinary actions for a 1-month DISP in fiscal year 2010 was less than the monthly increase in debt subject to the limit for most months of the year. As of August 31, 2010, the extraordinary actions available to Treasury could provide about $147.5 billion in additional borrowing capacity without a DISP and an additional $7.7 billion per month based on the length of the DISP declared. The amounts available from suspending G-Fund investments, suspending ESF investments and the disinvestment of CSRDF funds have all grown—with the bulk of the growth in the G-Fund. G-Fund growth results from an increase in federal employee retirement funds being invested in Treasury securities. However, the estimated total borrowing capacity provided by extraordinary actions available without a DISP is still $15 billion below Treasury’s average monthly borrowing needs in fiscal year 2010, which was over $162 billion, and only 44 percent of the largest single monthly increase in debt subject to the limit, which was over $330 billion. Treasury officials stated that there are no additional extraordinary actions within their legal authorities that could be prudently used in the future to create additional borrowing capacity.
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Table 2: Estimated Borrowing Capacity Provided by Extraordinary Actions
Dollars in billions
Fiscal year * 2002 * 2005 * 2006 * 2010
Extraordinary action
Extraordinary actions that do not require the declaration of a DISP
Exchanging FFB debt for debt that is subject to the limit * $0.0 * $1.0 * $1.0 * $4.8
Suspension of G-Fund investments * 44.0 * 62.6 * 72.2 * 122.3
Suspension of ESF investments * 9.8 * 15.2 * 15.6 * 20.4
Subtotal—extraordinary actions available without declaring a DISP * $53.8 * $78.8 * $88.8 * $147.5
Extraordinary actions that require the declaration of a DISP (amount per month based on the length of the DISP declared)
Suspension of new CSRDF investments * 1.7 * 2.0 * 2.1 * 2.0
Disinvestment of securities held by the CSRDF * 4.0 * 4.6 * 4.8 * 5.7
Total * $59.6 * $85.3 * $95.8 * $155.2
Source: GAO and Department of the Treasury.
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Notes: These estimates represent an approximation of the additional borrowing capacity provided by the extraordinary actions as of August 31st of each year—the last month in the fiscal year for which data are typical of most months of the year. They do not reflect the actual amount of borrowing capacity Treasury obtained by taking extraordinary actions in any given year.
Some or all of the $15 billion in FFB 9(a) securities that FFB can issue were already exchanged for debt subject to the limit.
Treasury can also suspend large investments to the CSRDF that are made three times a year. In June and December, Treasury makes semiannual interest payments to the CSRDF and in September, Treasury makes a onetime investment in the CSRDF for financing the unfunded liability of new and increased annuity benefits. These amounts would be added to the monthly averages calculated above.
Some of the options used in the past are either more limited or no longer available. FFB has the authority to issue up to $15 billion in securities that are not subject to the debt limit that it can exchange for other Treasury securities to reduce the amount of debt subject to the limit. However, some or all of these FFB securities may be outstanding from previous transactions, including those made to manage the amount of debt subject to the limit in the past, and therefore unavailable. For example, as of August 31, 2010, the exchange of FFB securities for other Treasury securities could provide less than $5 billion in additional borrowing capacity under the debt limit. In the past, FFB reversed these transactions by redeeming FFB 9(a) obligations prior to maturity once the debt limit was raised. However, Treasury officials said they no longer reverse these transactions because of the potential costs FFB and its counterparties could incur as a result.10 Also, until March 2004, Treasury kept “compensating balances” in non-interest-bearing accounts at banks to compensate them for collecting federal receipts for the Treasury. This allowed Treasury to call back tens of billions of dollars when needed to pay obligations and avoid breaching the debt limit.11 Since these compensating balances were replaced in March 2004 by direct payment to banks for services, this option is no longer available.
Assuming current borrowing trends, our estimates show that the borrowing capacity provided by the extraordinary actions would be sufficient to meet the government’s borrowing needs for as little as a few days to a few weeks during certain times of the year. This means that once debt approaches the debt limit, Treasury may not be able to manage the amount of debt subject to the limit for as long a period of time as it had in the past before the debt limit must be increased or payments must be delayed. The amount potentially provided by the extraordinary actions for a 1-month DISP in fiscal year 2010 was less than the monthly increase in debt subject to the limit in 8 of the 12 months. In contrast, in earlier years, the potential borrowing capacity provided by the extraordinary actions was greater than the monthly increase in debt subject to the limit in almost all months.
The actions available without declaration of a DISP could potentially provide $147.5 billion (as of Aug. 31, 2010), but the amount of time that these actions provide before debt reaches the limit depends on a number of factors. For instance, debt subject to the limit increases sharply certain days of the year. Treasury makes semiannual interest payments on a large amount of debt held in * * * * * * * * * * * *government accounts on the last day of June and December.12 During the recent debt limit debate in early fiscal year 2010, debt increased by more than $165 billion in a single day—December 31—because of $81 billion in net nonmarketable securities issuances, including interest payments to government accounts,13 as well as $84 billion in net marketable securities issuances.
Another factor that determines the amount of time that Treasury is able to manage debt near the debt limit is the size of Treasury’s operating cash balance. Treasury can draw down its operating cash balance to pay obligations rather than increase borrowing. While the size of Treasury’s operating cash balance routinely fluctuates throughout the year depending on the timing of withdrawals and deposits, table 3 shows that Treasury’s average operating cash balance was roughly twice as high in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 as it was in the previous 6 fiscal years. From December 15, 2009, to February 11, 2010, when debt was approaching the debt limit, Treasury’s operating cash balance (excluding the SFP account balance) rarely fell below $90 billion.14 Higher cash balances helped ensure that Treasury had enough cash available to make large disbursements on short notice. Treasury officials explained that higher cash balances were not related to the debt limit but rather to regular and predictable financing patterns coupled with large receipts and expenditures related to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Recovery Act, and other legislation to address the financial crisis and the economic downturn.
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Table 3: Average Operating Cash Balance Less Supplementary Financing Program Account Balance, Fiscal Years 2003-2010
Dollars in billions
Fiscal year * 2003 * 2004 * 2005 * 2006 * 2007 * 2008 * 2009 * 2010
Average operating cash balance * 17.9 * 20.5 * 25.9 * 26.4 * 30.6 * 24.9 * 58.9 * 57.7
Source: GAO analysis of Treasury data.
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The amount of additional borrowing capacity provided by disinvesting CSRDF securities depends on the length of the DISP declared by the Secretary.15 For past DISPs, the Secretary determined the amount of disinvestments based on the length of the DISP and the estimated monthly CSRDF benefit payments that would occur during this time. For example, Treasury declared a DISP from May 16 to June 28, 2002, and disinvested about $4 billion in Treasury securities held by the CSRDF. This amount was roughly equal to the amount that would have been needed to make 1 month’s worth of Civil Service benefit payments. Similarly, Treasury declared a 12-month DISP in November 1995 and disinvested $39.8 billion in Treasury securities held by the CSRDF, roughly the equivalent of 12 months’ worth of benefit payments. The statute does not require that disinvestments be made only for the purpose of making CSRDF benefit payments. However, Treasury cannot disinvest additional securities later to make those benefit payments. As a result, the amount provided by the CSRDF declines over the period of the DISP. In the past 16 years, the Secretary of the Treasury declared DISPs ranging from 14 days to 14 months. The period of time between the declaration of a DISP and the debt limit increase ranged from 1 day to 4-½ months.
Treasury Diverts Resources from Other Priorities to Manage Debt near the Limit
Debt and cash management require more time and Treasury resources as debt nears the debt limit. The size and timing of auctions must be adjusted when nearing the debt limit; cash and borrowing needs must be forecasted and monitored with increasing frequency and in increasing detail; and contingency plans and alternative scenarios for the possible implementation of extraordinary actions must be developed, reviewed, and tested. These activities divert time and Treasury resources from other cash and debt management issues. We reviewed estimates provided by the Office of Debt Management (ODM), the Office of Fiscal Projections (OFP), and the Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD) that overall indicated they devoted as much as several hundred hours per week to managing debt near the debt limit.
Treasury’s operational focus on the debt limit begins as early as 6 to 9 months before the debt limit is expected to be reached and increases as debt nears the limit. Since this work involves contingency planning, it is undertaken whether or not the debt limit is raised prior to the use of extraordinary actions or the declaration of a DISP. For example, Treasury staff develop projections under multiple scenarios of when debt might reach the debt limit. As debt nears the debt limit, these projections and scenarios are developed weekly, then daily, and finally as often as multiple times a day. According to Treasury, these projections and scenarios may take 3 of OFP’s 11 staff members between 2 to 4 hours per day to produce.
While Treasury needs accurate cash-flow forecasts to project changes in the amount of debt subject to the limit, the precision and frequency increases when debt is near or at the limit. While large regular and predictable payments and receipts—such as Medicare and Social Security payments and receipts from corporate taxes—cause predictable swings in daily deposits and withdrawals, an official from OFP said that it was uncertainty about other revenue and irregular payments that made planning and forecasting more difficult as debt approached the debt limit in fiscal year 2010. For example Treasury received an influx of repayments of more than $90 billion from financial institutions under TARP in December 2009. However, since Treasury did not know for certain when these payments would be received, Treasury officials ran multiple projections of when the debt limit would be reached.
Treasury uses the projections of debt subject to the limit not only for operational scenarios but also in meetings to inform senior Treasury officials—including the Secretary. These meetings also increase in frequency from monthly to as often as daily as debt approaches the limit. The meetings, which have included 10 or more executives and senior career staff, are used to discuss strategies for managing debt near the debt limit including the potential use of extraordinary actions. According to Treasury, these meetings can require several hours of preparation. While Treasury officials and staff can draw on previous experiences managing debt near the debt limit, they told us that each debt limit event presents new and different issues to be considered and addressed; in addition, there are often senior officials who have not been through the experience and must be fully briefed and prepared.
BPD—the bureau within Treasury that is responsible for implementing the extraordinary actions and the accounting associated with those transactions—also dedicates extensive resources on operations related to the debt limit. BPD estimates that a 2-month DISP results in roughly 1,900 hours of work including the time spent before, during, and after the debt limit increase. This includes more than 400 hours in the 6 weeks prior to the implementation of any extraordinary actions spent on meetings to prepare for when the debt limit is reached, preparation of parallel accounts and spreadsheets in the event that extraordinary actions involving the G-Fund and CSRDF are used, tests of the accounting system, and a mock auction to practice and verify procedures for potential auction postponements. BPD also estimates that it spends in excess of 140 hours on debt limit–related activities each week once the first extraordinary action is taken, and over 270 hours on activities such as unwinding past transactions and preparing reports after the debt limit has been increased. The increased workload could result in overtime hours for BPD employees.
Treasury officials said that the increased focus on debt limit–related operations in the months and weeks approaching the debt limit can divert time and attention from other tasks that could improve Treasury operations. For example, according to Treasury, OFP is able to spend less time working to update or improve the models it uses in routine forecasting of tax receipts, expenditures, and borrowing needs. Similarly, Treasury officials said that ODM is able to spend less time analyzing short-term financing needs that could help inform auction amounts. Both of these activities help Treasury more accurately project future borrowing needs to avoid the following: